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FRIENDS AS FIDUCIARIES
ETHAN J. LEIB*
This Article argues that the law of fiduciary duties provides a good
framework for friends to understand their duties to one another better,
gives courts a useful set of rhetorical and analytical tools to employ when
they are forced to entertain disputes that arise between close friends, and,
finally, can help direct courts to furnish betrayed friends certain kinds of
remedies that are most appropriate for achieving justice within that
dispute context. This is not the first Article to make an effort to expand the
reach of the fiduciary concept into new sorts of relationships that are not
always considered within the ambit offiduciary duty law. But the case for
thinking of friends as fiduciaries is exceedingly persuasive and
underappreciated, both in the law and in our lives.
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John and David are both thirty-three years old and have been friends
since college. They are not merely casual friends but stay in touch
regularly and are important parts of each other's lives. They share
intimacies, secrets, confidences, and trust each other with almost
everything. If asked, they would surely say that they love each other and
find each other to be very close to the center of their respective circles of
affection.
For some years, both have been looking for a way out of academia and
a way to pay for their children's private school tuitions. They have often
imagined that they would pursue a business venture together and, given
their competencies and interests, assumed that an environmentally friendly
beverage company in China would suit them well. They also both believed
that the venture would enrich them professionally and financially.
Although they had been chatting casually about the plan for four years,
neither had taken any affirmative steps to make the company a reality and
neither had suggested to the other that their business idea was confidential.
Last year, David was approached by a wealthy acquaintance, Daniel,
who was setting up shop in Beijing. Daniel casually knew David and John
from college but knew nothing of their plan to go into business together.
David, assuming that his "green" beverage company was unlikely to
become a reality with John anytime soon (John was in the middle of
researching his next book in South Korea and seemed, for the moment,
fulfilled by the academic life), pitched Daniel on the idea. Daniel loved the
plan and quickly set up Datong Drinks, a drink company that preached the
unity of earth and man. Reasonable projections suggest that the company
will be hugely profitable over the next five years. David was given a
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consulting contract by Datong (as a finder's fee reward, of sorts) worth
one million dollars.
John had been traveling in South Korea doing research over the last
year and stopped in Beijing recently on his way home. He went to his
favorite coffee shop in the hutongs of Beijing and asked for a drink menu.
He ordered a Datong "double green" iced tea. When he read the label, he
was surprised to learn that someone else had beaten him to the punch on
his business idea with David: the label was explicitly environmentalist.
But then he noticed that the president of the company was Daniel-
someone he knew from college.
He called Daniel in Beijing and they met up over some duck and beer.
Daniel told John the story of Datong and told him of David's role in the
development of the idea and his one million dollar contract.
John became furious and started thinking of ways he might sue David.
John knew David had betrayed their friendship in selling out their idea to
Daniel. But he was not sure if he could make out a legal claim against
David. He knew they had no explicit contract and did not quite think any
theft claim or intellectual property claim could be sustained.
But John had just completed reading a biography of Justice Benjamin
Cardozo. He remembered the famous case of Meinhard v. Salmon-and
its most notorious pronouncement:
Joint adventurers, like copartners, owe to one another, while the
enterprise continues, the duty of the finest loyalty. Many forms of
conduct permissible in a workaday world for those acting at arm's
length, are forbidden to those bound by fiduciary ties. A trustee is
held to something stricter than the morals of the market place. Not
honesty alone, but the punctilio of an honor the most sensitive, is
then the standard of behavior. As to this there has developed a
tradition that is unbending and inveterate. Uncompromising rigidity
has been the attitude of courts of equity when petitioned to
undermine the rule of undivided loyalty by the "disintegrating
erosion" of particular exceptions. Only thus has the level of conduct
for fiduciaries been kept at a level higher than that trodden by the
crowd. It will not consciously be lowered by any judgment of this
court.1
John wondered: Did David violate any fiduciary duties to him as his
friend? Is friendship a kind of "joint adventure" such that David's actions
1. Meinhard v. Salmon, 164 N.E. 545, 546 (N.Y. 1928) (citation omitted).
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could be deemed usurpation of what should have been their joint
opportunity? Were not the two of them in something "jointly, for better or
for worse," as Cardozo described Meinhard and Salmon's venture? 2 Did
David misappropriate information for his own purposes that could be
deemed confidential? If so, what remedy should be available to John?
Should David have to share his contract earnings from Datong? Should all
profits David receives from Datong be disgorged and placed in a
constructive trust for the benefit of both friends? For John exclusively?
Should John be compensated from those earnings for his prorated
contribution to the idea?
These queries stem neither from a real case nor from some law school
exam.3 But the central issue they raise-whether friends are fiduciaries for
some purposes and in some contexts-is not wholly hypothetical either.
Courts often need to assess whether the duties of friendship in moral life
can be translated into legal duties. When and if courts do transmogrify
friendship's duties into legally cognizable ones, they tend to enforce the
duties through a set of remedies often considered equitable: disgorgement,
the constructive trust, restitution. In short, the body of law courts consider
when presented with fact scenarios like the fictional one just sketched is
the law of fiduciary duties. And John was not far off in his channeling of
Cardozo's Meinhard opinion. In what follows, I defend the use of
fiduciary duty law to police the activities of close friends in certain
contexts. Although the example of David's behavior is illustrative of the
way a fiduciary duty of friendship might be breached, I hope to provide
some guidance here on other ways the law of fiduciary duties can be
employed to monitor the actions of our usually trustworthy close friends or
those who pose as them.
2. Id. The allusion to marriage in Meinhard is hard to ignore. Indeed, one of the briefs in the
case emphasized that Meinhard and Salmon were "on terms of social intimacy. They were warm and
personal friends. In 1901 and 1902 they met each other three or four times a week, frequently dining
together. In the summer of 1902, and off and on during previous summers, they roomed together."
Brief for the Plaintiff before the Appellate Division, Vol. 153 Cases and Points, Appellate Division
1928 at pp. 1467-70 (folios 675 and 672 of the record), cited in Robert B. Thompson, The Story of
Meinhard v. Salmon and Fiduciary Duty's Punctilio, in CORPORATE LAW STORIES (J. Mark Ramseyer
ed., forthcoming 2009).
3. And in which course could such a question be asked anyway? Corporations? Contracts? I
have stipulated that David and John manage no corporation and that they have never entered a
contract. Perhaps there is an intellectual property rule (the "idea submission doctrine") that might be
applicable. See, e.g., Desny v. Wilder, 286 P.2d 55 (Cal. 1956); see generally Lionel S. Sobel, The
Law of Ideas, Revisited, 1 UCLA ENT. L. REv. 9 (1994). But let us assume that doctrine does not apply
here either. Thanks to Eric Goldman for the exposure to the idea submission literature.
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To be sure, the fiduciary concept is still very much contested4 and some
famously think "there is no subject here."5 More, many will recoil from
the idea that friendship, an activity deeply rooted in the private sphere,
should be subject to legal standards6 (though these people will at least
learn that, normative arguments aside, our courts do sometimes treat
friends as fiduciaries). Still, I hope to make the case here that the law of
fiduciary duties provides a good framework for friends to understand their
duties to one another better, gives courts a useful set of rhetorical and
analytical tools to employ when they are forced to entertain disputes that
arise between close friends, and, finally, can help direct courts to furnish
betrayed friends certain kinds of remedies that are most appropriate for
achieving justice within that dispute context. This is not the first article to
make an effort to expand the reach of the fiduciary concept into new sorts
of relationships that are not always considered within the ambit of
fiduciary duty law.7 But the case for thinking of friends as fiduciaries is
4. Of course, a group of committed scholars from common law countries have tried to
illuminate the concept over the last few decades. See, e.g., LEONARD I. ROTMAN, FIDUCIARY LAW
(2005); J.C. SHEPHERD, THE LAW OF FIDUCIARIES (1981); Robert C. Clark, Agency Costs Versus
Fiduciary Duties, in PRINCIPALS AND AGENTS 55 (John W. Pratt & Richard J. Zeckhauser eds., 1985);
Robert Cooter & Bradley J. Freedman, The Fiduciary Relationship: Its Economic Character and Legal
Consequences, 66 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1045 (1991); Kenneth B. Davis, Jr., Judicial Review of Fiduciary
Decisionmaking-Some Theoretical Perspectives, 80 Nw. U. L. REV. 1 (1985); Deborah A. DeMott,
Beyond Metaphor: An Analysis of Fiduciary Obligation, 1988 DUKE L.J. 879; Scott FitzGibbon,
Fiduciary Relationships Are Not Contracts, 82 MARQ. L. REV. 303 (1999); Robert Flannigan, The
Economics of Fiduciary Accountability, 32 DEL. J. CORP. L. 393 (2007); Robert Flannigan, The
Fiduciary Obligation, 9 Ox. J. LEGAL STUD. 285 (1989) [hereinafter Flannigan, The Fiduciary
Obligation]; Tamar Frankel, Fiduciary Law, 71 CAL. L. REV. 795 (1983); Lawrence E. Mitchell, The
Death of Fiduciary Duty in Close Corporations, 138 U. PA. L. REV. 1675 (1990); Eileen A. Scallen,
Promises Broken vs. Promised Betrayed: Metaphor, Analogy, and the New Fiduciary Principle, 1993
U. ILL. L. REV. 897; L.S. Sealy, Fiduciary Relationships, 1962 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 69; J.C. Shepherd,
Towards a Unified Concept of Fiduciary Relationships, 97 LAW Q. REV. 51 (1981); D. Gordon Smith,
The Critical Resource Theory of Fiduciary Duty, 55 VAND. L. REV. 1399 (2002); Ernest J. Weinrib,
The Fiduciary Obligation, 25 U. TORONTO L.J. 1 (1975).
5. Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Contract and Fiduciary Duty, 38 J.L. & ECON.
425, 438 (1993).
6. I have addressed this objection at length in Ethan J. Leib, Friendship & the Law, 54 UCLA L.
REV. 631, 662-67 (2007), and will not revisit it here. I have also attempted to define the concept of the
friend, id. at 638-53, so will bracket any definitional challenges here about who may count as a "close
friend" for purposes of the law's administration. I will, however, have occasion to discuss more
specific objections to treating the friend as a fiduciary, infra Part IV.
7. See, e.g., DANIEL J. SOLOVE, THE DIGITAL PERSON: TECHNOLOGY AND PRIVACY IN THE
INFORMATION AGE 103 (2004) (arguing that a fiduciary relationship should be recognized between
consumers who provide personal data and the companies to which they provide them); Harold Brown,
Franchising: A Fiduciary Relationship, 49 TEx. L. REV. 650 (1971); Evan J. Criddle, Fiduciary
Foundations of Administrative Law, 54 UCLA L. REV. 117 (2006); John Burritt McArthur, The
Restatement (First) of the Oilfield Operator's Fiduciary Duty, 45 NAT. RESOURCES J. 587 (2005); Paul
B. Miller & Charles Weijer, Fiduciary Obligation in Clinical Research, 34 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 424
(2006); Brett G. Scharffs & John W. Welch, An Analytic Framework for Understanding and
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exceedingly persuasive and underappreciated, both in the law and in our
lives.
The first three parts of this Article contain my affirmative argument.
Part I begins with a simplified introduction to fiduciary relationships, their
concomitant obligations, and the remedies breaches of fiduciary duties can
be expected to trigger. Exploring these three components of fiduciary law
should reveal the underlying concept of the fiduciary that helps to shape
the contours of the relationships, the duties, and the common remedies
courts use in policing fiduciary default. Part II aims to prove that the
fiduciary concept can be usefully applied to the relationship of friendship;
the proposal here to treat friends as fiduciaries is not merely metaphorical
or analogical . Part III shows that some courts do, in fact, see the
relationship of friendship as triggering certain fiduciary duties. This
grounding in case law helps buttress my normative argument that the law
should (and can) police betrayed friendships.
Part IV countenances some objections to the proposal from within the
fiduciary concept. In particular, I consider whether the presumed equality,
reciprocity, and free exit attributed to close friendships render the
fiduciary concept inappropriate. I also consider the possibility that
thinking of the friend as a fiduciary might do damage to fiduciary law by
stretching it too far. It might also facilitate the law's "crowding" out the
inherent trust friendship promotes and sustains.9 Part V concludes.
In short, we should accept close friendship as triggering certain
fiduciary duties. Courts have already started to treat friends as
fiduciaries-and there is much that can be appreciated about friendship
itself when friends begin to see their relationships through the lens of the
fiduciary concept.
Evaluating the Fiduciary Duties of Educators, 2005 BYU EDUC. & L.J. 159; Elizabeth S. Scott &
Robert E. Scott, Parents as Fiduciaries, 81 VA. L. REV. 2401 (1995); Roberto Mangabeira Unger, The
Critical Legal Studies Movement, 96 HARV. L. REV. 561, 633, 641 (1983); Jennifer L. White, Note,
When It's OK to Sell the Monet: A Trustee-Fiduciary-Duty Framework for Analyzing the
Deaccessioning ofArt To Meet Museum Operating Expenses, 94 MICH. L. REV. 1041 (1996).
8. Cf Scott & Scott, supra note 7, at 2419 (explaining that the purpose of their article about
"parents as fiduciaries" is "to push the analogy beyond rhetoric").
9. The "crowding" thesis is explored in, for example, BRUNO S. FREY, NOT JUST FOR THE
MONEY (1997); Iris Bohnet et al., More Order with Less Law: On Contract Enforcement, Trust, and
Crowding, 95 AM. POL. SC. REV. 131 (2001); Larry E. Ribstein, Law v. Trust, 81 B.U. L. REV. 553,
568-71(2001).
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I. THE FIDUCIARY
Before one can ascertain whether calling friends fiduciaries is simply a
category mistake, one needs a working understanding of the fiduciary idea
in the law. Given that "the prevailing view remains that fiduciary law is'elusive,"' 1 0 the cut at the subject here cannot help but be somewhat
selective and reductive. Still, there is broadscale agreement about much
having to do with fiduciaries in the law, and I focus here upon those areas
of agreement. Assume that what I am describing below is the law of the
last hundred years, leaving the genealogy of the modem fiduciary in the
Roman "fiducia" and "fidei-commissia" and in the "trusts" of the Middle
Ages to the historians.11
A. The Fiduciary Relationship
There are certain categories of relationships that are virtually always
treated as fiduciary in nature, and these relationships are often treated as
paradigmatically fiduciary. They include attorney-client, corporate
director-shareholders, trustee-beneficiary, managing partner-partner,
agent-principal, employee-employer, guardian-ward, and physician-
patient. 2 Sometimes other relationships are also deemed fiduciary-and,
like the paradigmatic examples, are treated as such as a mere function of
the relationship's existence rather than upon a contextual analysis of the
quality of the particular relationship.1 3 The aforementioned relationships
might be called "formal" fiduciary relationships.1 4
But relationships of status are not the only kind of relationships that are
treated as fiduciary in the law. There are also "informal" fiduciary
10. Smith, supra note 4, at 1400.
11. For some of this history, see generally 1 AUSTIN WAKEMAN SCOTT & WILLIAM FRANKLIN
FRATCHER, THE LAW OF TRUSTS (William Franklin Fratcher ed., 4th ed. 1987); ERNEST VINTER, A
TREATISE ON THE HISTORY AND LAW OF FIDUCIARY RELATIONSHIP AND RESULTING TRUSTS (3d ed.
1955); Jerry W. Markham, Fiduciary Duties Under the Commodity Exchange Act, 68 NOTRE DAME L.
REv. 199 (1992).
12. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 1.01 (2006); FitzGibbon, supra note 4, at 306-08
(citing authorities); Smith, supra note 4, at 1400. There is some debate in the corporate context about
whether the fiduciary duty is owed to the shareholder or to the corporation-and whether it is the
director who owes it rather than the board. See generally Darian M. Ibrahim, Individual or Collective
Liability for Corporate Directors?, 93 IOWA L. REv. 929 (2008); D. Gordon Smith, The Shareholder
Primacy Norm, 23 J. CORP. L. 277 (1998). But let's leave that debate aside here. For the most part, I
will adopt the convention of calling the first in the dyad a "fiduciary" and the second a "beneficiary."
13. See Larry E. Ribstein, Are Partners Fiduciaries?, 2005 U. ILL. L. REv. 209, 211 (listing
franchisees-franchisors and pharmacists-customers as examples).
14. See Smith, supra note 4, at 1412-13.
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relationships, which are identified through more qualitative evaluations.
These relationships are sometimes called "confidential relationships ' 15 and
are often called "fact-based., 16 They are routinely identified when a court
finds that a relationship of "trust" exists and that one party dominates, is
superior to, or is especially vulnerable to another party. 17 Admittedly,
vague standards for confidential relationships abound-but there is no
question that courts embrace many types of relationships based on their
internal qualities rather than their names. Although this imprecision can be
frustrating for fiduciary typologists and those who wish the law of
fiduciary duties to provide firmer guidance on the forms of relationships
that are susceptible to treatment as fiduciary, no typology of the fiduciary
could be complete without recognizing a few central features: the concept
is self-consciously open, flexible, and adaptable to new kinds of
relationships 18-and those relationships trade upon high levels of trust and
leave one party in a position of domination, inferiority, or vulnerability. 19
15. See id. Although some purists might try to exclude confidential relationships from the
category of fiduciary relationships because they are often treated as somewhat less restrictive than true
status-based fiduciary relationships, it would be very hard to sustain this neat separation. Indeed,
courts are not especially principled in highlighting and sustaining such a distinction. See, e.g., Fipps v.
Stidham, 50 P.2d 680, 683 (Okla. 1935) ("Confidential and fiduciary relations are in law synonymous,
and exist whenever trust and confidence is reposed by one person in the integrity and fidelity of
another."); Rieger v. Rich, 329 P.2d 770, 778 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1958) ("Confidential or fiduciary
relationship[s] ... in law are synonymous."); see also BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 318, 658, 1314-15
(8th ed. 2004) (indicating that confidential relationships are synonymous with fiduciary relationships).
For more on informal fiduciary relationships in particular, see Roy Ryden Anderson, The Wolf at the
Campfire: Understanding Confidential Relationships, 53 SMU L. REV. 315 (2000); Gregory B.
Westfall, Comment, But I Know It When I See It: A Practical Framework for Analysis and Argument
of Informal Fiduciary Relationships, 23 TEx. TECH L. REV. 835 (1992). These last two articles start
thinking about friendship's role in fiduciary law but do not get very far.
To be sure, there may be some meaningful differences in the burdens of persuasion and burdens of
proof between the formal and informal fiduciary relationships-those in confidential relationships
have to show actual reliance and have the burden to prove the existence of the relationship, whereas
those in formal fiduciary relationships do not need to prove reliance and fiduciaries will have the
burden to show their transactions were fair-but these differences are not terribly important for my
purposes here. See Burdett v. Miller, 957 F.2d 1375, 1382 (7th Cir. 1992) (Posner, J.); Scallen, supra
note 4, at 907.
16. See Flannigan, The Fiduciary Obligation, supra note 4, at 301 ("The question-who is a
fiduciary?-is answered very simply or only after a detailed examination of the facts. It is simply
answered if the relationship falls within the nominate categories deemed to be fiduciary .... Other
relationships may exceptionally involve a trust equivalent to or stronger than even the closest
relationship between, for example, a solicitor and a client .... These are 'fact-based' fiduciary
relationships."). For some of the difficulties in specifying the requisites for these relationships, see
generally Deborah A. DeMott, Breach of Fiduciary Duty: On Justifiable Expectations of Loyalty and
Their Consequences, 48 ARiz. L. REV. 925 (2006).
17. See Smith, supra note 4, at 1413-14.
18. See Harper v. Adametz, 113 A.2d 136, 139 (Conn. 1955) ("[E]quity has carefully refrained
from defining a fiduciary relationship in precise detail and in such a manner as to exclude new
situations."); John C. Coffee, Jr., From Tort to Crime: Some Reflections on the Criminalization of
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It will only be possible to get more specific about which relationships
qualify for treatment as fiduciary once one has a firmer understanding of
the concept of the fiduciary itself. But that effort must await more
information about what is at stake in calling someone a fiduciary. For that
reason, I defer further discussion about identifying fiduciary relationships
until after I explore the fiduciary duties and the remedies associated with
the breaches thereof.
B. The Fiduciary Duties
Once a court determines that a fiduciary relationship has formed
between parties, courts can be expected to scrutinize the conduct of the
parties against the background of a set of duties to which fiduciaries must
conform their behavior. Although the list of "true" fiduciary duties-
duties that are imposed only on fiduciaries-can be quite short (depending
upon whom you ask), the list of duties that tend to be associated with
fiduciaries-duties that may also be imposed on other kinds of parties but
tend to be discussed in the context of fiduciary relationships-is somewhat
longer.20 Certain fiduciary relationships implicate the majority of the
mdange of duties that follow, and some trigger only consideration of a
few. Ultimately, there is stunning variety, both in scope and substance, in
the set of duties that apply to any given fiduciary relationship.2 1 Capturing
the set at a level of generality suffices here.
The core fiduciary duty is the duty of loyalty, a duty of unselfishness.
22
As Professor Lynn Stout puts it:
Fiduciary Breaches and the Problematic Line Between Law and Ethics, 19 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 117,
150 (1981) ("The common law has in fact always defined [informal fiduciary relationships] with
deliberate imprecision and perhaps surprising expansiveness.").
19. See, e.g., Higgins v. Chicago Title & Trust Co., 143 N.E. 482, 484 (Ill. 1924) ("[An informal
fiduciary relationship] exists in all cases in which influence has been acquired and abused, in which
confidence has been reposed and betrayed. The origin of the confidence is immaterial. It may be
moral, social, domestic, or merely personal."); Hoge v. George, 200 P. 96, 102 (Wyo. 1921) (finding
confidential relationships to exist where "there [i]s confidence reposed on the one side and accepted on
the other, with a resulting dependence by the one party and influence by the other").
20. See generally Deborah A. DeMott, DisloyalAgents, 58 ALA. L. REV. 1049 (2007).
21. See Davis, supra note 4, at 24-25 (highlighting that duties are much more rigorous in some
contexts (citing the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY §§ 1, 387 (1957)) than others (citing id.
§ 190 cmt. A; MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT § 8.30(a)(1)(3) (1984)); Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 5,
at 432 (duties deviate substantially depending on which relationship is at issue); Scallen, supra note 4,
at 910 n.48 ("[L]abelling someone a 'fiduciary' does not charge him or her with the same 'bag of
duties' and degree of obligation imposed on all other categories of fiduciaries."); Scallen, supra note 4,
at 911 ("The nature of the fiduciary obligation varies depending on the particular factual context.");
Smith, supra note 4, at 1483-84.
22. But see Scallen, supra note 4, at 908 ("[T]he fiduciary obligation is not one of selflessness; it
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The keystone of the duty of loyalty is the legal obligation that the
fiduciary use her powers not for her own benefit but for the
exclusive benefit of her beneficiary. It is highly improper-indeed
proscribed-for a fiduciary to extract a personal benefit from her
fiduciary position without her beneficiary's consent, even when she
can do this without harming the beneficiary.
23
The fiduciary is prohibited from engaging in self-interested transactions
and is saddled with the task of pursuing the interests of her beneficiary
24above her own. So "inflexible" is the duty of loyalty that it requires a
fiduciary to be "undivided" and "undiluted" in her fidelity,25 though, of
course, "[f]iduciaries are not obliged to attend to their fiduciary duties to
the exclusion of other personal obligations and activities. 2 6
Rhetoric aside, from a practical standpoint, this restrictive duty requires
fiduciaries to pursue self-dealing only after getting an informed waiver
from her beneficiary and to avoid conflicts of interest, secret profits, and
misappropriating benefits that should accrue to the beneficiary or the joint
relationship. 27 Even with this most central fiduciary duty, however, the
strictness with which it will be enforced varies, depending on the type and
scope of the fiduciary relationship at issue.28
The second duty that is routinely discussed in connection with
fiduciaries is the duty of care.29 The duty requires fiduciaries to perform
their responsibilities for their beneficiaries with reasonable diligence and
prudence.30 Although the duty resembles a basic requirement to avoid
negligence, 31 the duty is flexible and can require more substantial
imposes no duty of altruism. Even in the original fiduciary relationship, that of trustee/beneficiary,
there is no black letter principle that the trustee must always put the beneficiary's interest ahead of her
own.").
23. Lynn A. Stout, On the Export of US. -Style Corporate Fiduciary Duties to Other Cultures:
Can a Transplant Take?, in GLOBAL MARKETS, DOMESTIC INSTITUTIONS: CORPORATE LAW AND
GOVERNMENT IN A NEW ERA OF CROSS-BORDER DEALS 46, 55 (Curtis J. Milhaupt ed., 2003).
24. See, e.g., Bayer v. Beran, 49 N.Y.S.2d 2, 5 (Sup. Ct. 1944) ("The concept of loyalty, of
constant, unqualified fidelity, has a definite and precise meaning. The fiduciary must subordinate his
individual and private interests to his duty... whenever the two conflict."); RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF AGENCY § 387 (1958) (describing a fiduciary's duty "to act solely for the benefit of the principal in
all matters connected with his agency").
25. Birnbaumv. Birnbaum, 539 N.E.2d 574, 576 (N.Y. 1989).
26. Scott & Scott, supra note 7, at 2426; see also Scallen, supra note 4, at 908 ("[C]lassic
fiduciary relationships are by no means divorced from self-serving considerations.").
27. See Cooter & Freedman, supra note 4, at 1047, 1054-55.
28. Smith, supra note 4, at 1482.
29. See generally Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985); ROBERT CHARLES CLARK,
CORPORATE LAW 123-36 (1986).
30. See Scott & Scott, supra note 7, at 2420.
31. Thus some claim that the duty of care is not distinctively fiduciary after all. See Ribstein,
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diligence than would be required of non-fiduciaries.32 In contrast to the
predominantly prohibitive nature of the duty of loyalty, the duty of care
has an affirmative component occasionally requiring affirmative action.33
Still, in practice the duty of care is relatively weak, at least in the corporate
context-and it is rare for a fiduciary to run afoul of it. This is because,
unlike the duty of loyalty, the party alleging a breach must be able to show
that an injury resulted from the fiduciary's failure to meet the standard of
care. 34 Furthermore, courts tend to give fiduciaries substantial discretion in
performing their responsibilities; recklessness and gross negligence tend to
be the standards as a matter of practice. 35
Aside from these two central fiduciary duties-or, perhaps, growing
out of them-are a set of duties that are routinely associated with
fiduciaries. Fiduciaries have a duty of utmost candor and disclosure.36 This
may take the form of requiring doctors to reveal their personal financial
interests to their patients (even when those interests are "unrelated to the
patient's health")37 or it may take the form of a general "accounting"
requirement, necessitating accurate bookkeeping subject to inspection by
the beneficiary as well as the disclosure of all relevant information
pertaining to the relationship.38
The flipside of the disclosure requirement is a duty of confidentiality.
The professional responsibilities of lawyers and doctors generally prevent
them from revealing the confidences of their clients and patients,
respectively. But fiduciaries commonly are required to maintain secrets
and respect duties of confidentiality. Although commentators have
supra note 13, at 223; Smith, supra note 4, at 1409.
32. Bayer v. Beran, 49 N.Y.S.2d 2, 5 (Sup. Ct. 1944) ("The responsibility-that is, the care and
the diligence-required of an agent or of a fiduciary, is proportioned to the occasion. It is a concept
that has, and necessarily so, a wide penumbra of meaning-a concept, however, which becomes
sharpened in its practical application to the given facts of a situation.").
33. See Cooter & Freedman, supra note 4, at 1047, 1049 & n.8.
34. John H. Langbein, The Contractarian Basis of the Law of Trusts, 105 YALE L.J. 625, 656
(1995).
35. See Scott & Scott, supra note 7, at 2423-24 (discussing the "business judgment rule," a
presumption that corporate directors exercise due diligence, their fiduciary duties notwithstanding).
36. See Libby v. L.J. Corp., 247 F.2d 78, 81 (D.C. Cir. 1957); Jordan v. Duffs & Phelps, 815
F.2d 429, 436 (7th Cir. 1987) (enforcing a fiduciary duty of disclosure); Wendt v. Fischer, 154 N.E.
303, 304 (N.Y. 1926) (Cardozo, J.) ("If dual interests are to be served, the disclosure to be effective
must lay bare the truth, without ambiguity or reservation, in all its stark significance."); DeMott, supra
note 4, at 882 (fiduciaries "must be candid"); FitzGibbon, supra note 4, at 308 ("[The fiduciary] has an
especially high duty of disclosure: He must go beyond avoiding fraud and false statements; he is
obliged to 'volunteer' information.").
37. Moore v. Regents of the Univ. of California, 793 P.2d 479, 483 (Cal. 1990).
38. See Rosenthal v. Rosenthal, 543 A.2d 348, 352 (Me. 1988); Herring v. Offutt, 295 A.2d 876,
879 (Md. 1972); 2A SCOTT & FRATCHER, supra note 11, § 172, at 452.
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distinguished between "non-fiduciary" duties of confidentiality and the
fiduciary duty of loyalty that requires fiduciaries to "refrain from using the
information for personal advantage," 39 courts can and do discuss the duty
of confidentiality as part of the general package of fiduciary duties. In
United States v. Chestman, for example, the Second Circuit identified the
duty as follows:
What has been said of an agent's duty of confidentiality applies
with equal force to other fiduciary relations: "an agent is subject to
a duty to the principal not to use or to communicate information
confidentially given him by the principal or acquired by him during
the course of or on account of his agency."' 0
This fiduciary duty is not only the duty not to misappropriate the
information for the fiduciary's own use, but is also a duty not to
communicate the information itself.41
Perhaps a more controversial duty associated with fiduciaries is the
duty of good faith.42 It is controversial because many have a hard time
distinguishing a fiduciary's duty of good faith from a general duty of good
faith that pervades all performance of contractual duties.43 Moreover,
many feel that the duty of good faith is simply a way of expressing duties
imposed by other obligations, like the duty of disclosure, the duty of
loyalty, or the duty of care." But it is not hard to find courts expressing
39. Smith, supra note 4, at 1460; see also SHEPHERD, supra note 4, at 319 (the doctrine
respecting confidential information is "analogous to" and "related to" but "different from the law of
fiduciaries"). But see Ribstein, supra note 13, at 221 ("The duty not to misappropriate is not a
fiduciary duty ... ").
40. 947 F.2d 551, 569 (2d Cir. 1991) (emphasis added) (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
AGENCY § 395 (1958)).
41. See Scallen, supra note 4, at 910 ("A fiduciary must not use confidential information
acquired in the course of his office for his own purposes, or reveal the information to a third person.").
It is worth remembering, of course, that one may owe duties of confidentiality without owing other
"true" fiduciary duties.
42. See FitzGibbon, supra note 4, at 309; Burdett v. Miller, 957 F.2d 1375, 1381 (7th Cir. 1992)
(Posner, J.) ("A fiduciary duty is the duty of an agent to treat his principal with the utmost candor,
rectitude, care, loyalty, and good faith"); In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 907 A.2d 693, 753-
57 (Del. Ch. 2005) (identifying duty of good faith), aff'd, 906 A.2d 693 (Del. 2006).
43. The general duty of good faith in contractual relations is derived from U.C.C. § 1-304 (2008)
("Every contract or duty within this Act imposes an obligation of good faith in its performance or
enforcement."); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 205 (1981) ("Every contract
imposes upon each party a duty of good faith and fair dealing in its performance and its
enforcement.").
44. See Ribstein, supra note 13, at 211, 223. In many respects, this perspective has been recently
confirmed in Stone v. Ritter:
[A]lthough good faith many be described colloquially as part of a "triad" of fiduciary duties
that includes the duties of care and loyalty, the obligation to act in good faith does not
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the idea that fiduciaries owe their beneficiaries a higher standard of good
faith than would be required of mere contract partners: 45 "Utmost" good
faith is the benchmark,46 and the breach of that duty in the fiduciary
context can lead to much more substantial remedies for the injured.47
Thus, although some treat the duty of good faith as merely"commercially oriented" and different from the "altruism" required of the
fiduciary,48 the rhetoric of good faith appears with frequency in cases
imposing and discussing fiduciary duties; it seems that courts have
something more in mind than the mere contractual duty of good faith.
Moreover, fiduciaries need not necessarily be bound by contracts
controlling every aspect of their relationship, so the duty of good faith-
even if it were identical to the contractual duty-could add substance to
the duties of the fiduciary outside of the contractual portion of their
relationship with their beneficiaries. For example, prior contractual
relations do not impose a duty to negotiate in good faith for subsequent
contracts, only to perform and enforce in good faith the contracts that
already exist.49 But a fiduciary relationship might trigger a duty to
negotiate in good faith. 0
establish an independent fiduciary duty that stands on the same footing as the duties of care
and loyalty. Only the latter two duties, where violated, may directly result in liability, whereas
failure to act in good faith may do so, but indirectly.
911 A.2d 362, 370 (Del. 2006). This recent holding has already been the source of vigorous
commentary, and many agree that, rhetoric notwithstanding, the good faith obligation for fiduciaries
retains bite, even if it seems to be subsumed under the larger rubric of the duty of loyalty. See, e.g.,
Stephen M. Bainbridge et al., The Convergence of Good Faith and Oversight (UCLA Sch. of Law,
Law & Econ. Research Paper Series No. 07-09), available at http://ssrn.com/ abstract= 1006097
("[T]his holding may not matter much, because the Stone court makes clear that acts taken in bad faith
breach the duty of loyalty."); Letter from Deborah A. DeMott to author (Sept. 12, 2007) (on file with
author) ("My reading of [Stone and In re Walt Disney Co. Shareholder Derivative Litig.] is that they
treat the duty of good faith as a subset of the duty of loyalty, clarifying that a director's duty of loyalty
encompasses more than the negative duty to refrain from unconsented-to self-dealing.").
45. See, e.g., Kham & Nate's Shoes No. 2, Inc. v. First Bank, 908 F.2d 1351, 1357 (7th Cir.
1990) (Easterbrook, J.) (discounting contractual good faith requirement because "[p]arties to a contract
are not each others' fiduciaries").
46. Union Miniere, S.A. v. Parday Corp., 521 N.E.2d 700, 703 (Ind. Ct. App. 1988); see also
DeMott, supra note 4, at 882 (fiduciary "must evince utmost good faith").
47. See E. Allan Farnsworth, Your Loss or My Gain? The Dilemma of the Disgorgement
Principle in Breach of Contract, 94 YALE L.J. 1339, 1356 (1985) ("[T]he disgorgement principle
applies to breach of a fiduciary obligation while the expectation principle applies to a breach of
contractual obligation.").
48. See Mitchell, supra note 4, at 1727.
49 See JOHN EDWARD MURRAY JR., MURRAY ON CONTRACTS § 96, at 570 (4th ed. 2001) ("It is clear
that, as a matter of common law or the UCC, the obligation of good faith extends only to the contract
and not to its formation.").
50. Some commentators miss this point because they insist that courts must analyze fiduciary
obligations "that focus[] on the parties' positions after their relationship has been established."
DeMott, supra note 4, at 893; see also Weinrib, supra note 4, at 6 (arguing that courts must look to
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Finally, when a fiduciary relationship exists between parties,
misrepresentations of opinion can be actionable as fraud under this
specialized duty of good faith. In "mere" contractual relations, by contrast,
often only misrepresentations of fact are actionable, the contractual duty of
good faith notwithstanding.51
C. The Fiduciary Remedies
There is a set of remedies that courts routinely impose when they find a
breach of fiduciary duty. Indeed, if it were not circular and decidedly
unhelpful in guiding courts, one might even be tempted to define the entire
field of fiduciary law by the remedies extracted from fiduciaries.52
Although, like the fiduciary duties themselves, the remedies get enforced
with variable degrees of strictness depending on the relationship and the
nature of the breach, there are some general commonalities in the remedies
used in the fiduciary context. In sum, fiduciaries who breach their duties
will likely find themselves needing to disgorge their profits, to place their
earnings in a constructive trust, to restitute their beneficiaries, and/or to
pay punitive damages.
Disgorgement often follows from the breach of the duty of loyalty: if a
fiduciary has betrayed the principle of unselfishness, she will have to
disgorge all of her profits.53 This remedy is demanded of the defaulting
fiduciary even if the self-interested transaction caused no harm to the
beneficiary. For example, a trustee who self-deals with the assets of a trust
beneficiary will be expected to disgorge his profits even if no damage
came to the property of the beneficiary.54 At least part of the rationale for
parties' positions after, not before, agreement). This cautionary note makes sense in some cases but not
others: sometimes the fiduciary relationship preexists a contract and it is precisely there that a duty of
good faith could have teeth because no contractual duty of good faith has yet arisen. Further, given that
the moment of formation of fiduciary relations can be fuzzy, see FitzGibbon, supra note 4, at 338-39,
focusing only on "post-consummation" positions can be arbitrary.
51. See, e.g., Vokes v. Arthur Murray, Inc., 212 So. 2d 906, 908 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1968) ("It is
true that generally a misrepresentation, to be actionable, must be one of fact rather than of opinion. But
this rule ... does not apply where there is a fiduciary relationship between the parties .... ") (internal
quotation and citations omitted). This rule is not universal. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS
§§ 539, 542, 543 (1989) (offering other examples where reliance on a statement of opinion can lead to
a cause of action).
52. See Sealy, supra note 4, at 72-73.
53. See, e.g., Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 5, at 441; Ribstein, supra note 13, at 223; Scott
& Scott, supra note 7, at 2422; Scallen, supra note 4, at 912 ("The standard remedy for a breach of
fiduciary duty is disgorgement of the profits obtained .. "); Smith, supra note 4, at 1487.
54. See Melanie B. Leslie, Trusting Trustees: Fiduciary Duties and the Limits of Default Rules,
94 GEO. L.J. 67, 112 (2005).
HeinOnline  -- 86 Wash. U. L. Rev. 678 2008-2009
2009] FRIENDS AS FIDUCIARIES 679
the disgorgement remedy (beyond a deterrence potential)55 is that
beneficiaries will rarely be capable of formulating precise expectations;
they rely on their fiduciaries quite broadly, so measuring damages by the
fiduciary's gain can make more sense than an expectancy-based remedy,
56common in contractual breaches. Nevertheless, standard "loss stemming
from breach" damages are also routinely available, if not especially
distinctive.
The remedy of disgorgement is often accomplished through a
"constructive trust" imposed by law (rather than through the intent of an
individual, as in a plain vanilla trust).57 Indeed, Meinhard v. Salmon itself
is illustrative. In this case, Salmon appropriated a business opportunity
that arose from his real estate venture with Meinhard. Salmon's breach of
his fiduciary duties to Meinhard resulted in a constructive trust over
certain assets that should have been shared: "A constructive trust is, then,
the remedial device through which preference of self is made subordinate
to loyalty to others. 58 Judge Cardozo had explained the constructive trust
and its role in the menu of remedies nearly ten years earlier:
A constructive trust is the formula through which the conscience of
equity finds expression. When property has been acquired in such
circumstances that the holder of legal title may not in good
conscience retain the beneficial interest, equity converts him into a
trustee.59
Ultimately, although the "constructive trust originated in cases
involving breaches of fiduciary obligations by errant trustees" who
violated their duty of loyalty,60 the constructive trust remedy can be sought
against a fiduciary even when the predicate duty breached is one other
than the duty of loyalty. In many American jurisdictions, for example,
fiduciary and confidential relationships must be shown to qualify for the
remedy of a constructive trust, but the basis of the remedy can be the
breach of different duty. 61
55. HANOCH DAGAN, THE LAW AND ETHICS OF RESTITUTION 214 (2004).
56. See Ribstein, supra note 13, at 217.
57. See Scallen, supra note 4, at 912.
58. 164 N.E. 545, 548 (N.Y. 1928).
59. Beatty v. Guggenheim Exploration Co., 122 N.E. 378, 380 (N.Y. 1919).
60. DAGAN, supra note 55, at 300.
61. See Schwartz v. Houss, No. 21741/04, 2005 WL 579152, at *4 (N.Y. App. Div. Jan. 3, 2005)
("It is well settled that in order to set forth a valid cause of action to impose a constructive trust, the
following four elements must be alleged: '(1) a confidential or fiduciary relationship, (2) a promise,
express or implied, (3) a transfer in reliance thereon, and (4) unjust enrichment."'); Cody v. Gallow,
214 N.Y.S.2d 127 (App. Div. 1961) (imposing a constructive trust upon finding a confidential
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Another variation on the theme of equitable remedies available for the
breach of fiduciary duties is restitution (though disgorgement and the
constructive trust can, of course, themselves be construed as restitutionary
remedies). Restitutionary remedies have long been identified with the
breach of fiduciary duties,62 and they enable beneficiaries to extract from
their fiduciaries potentially supercompensatory remedies. Even in a
contract dispute between a fiduciary and her beneficiary, for example, the
measure of damages might exceed mere expectancy damages and result in
a payment by the fiduciary that exceeds the standard measure of
compensation available in contractual relationships. 63
The classic example may be Snepp v. United States.64 Frank W. Snepp
III was bound by a contractual duty not to publish a book about his
activities with the Central Intelligence Agency without submitting it to the
agency for prepublication review. Although no confidential information
was, in fact, revealed, the courts required Snepp to pay a restitutionary
rather than a compensatory remedy.65 The fiduciary relationship between
Snepp and the government triggered supercompensatory remediation even
though breach of a contractual term usually results only in expectancy
damages, not a profits-based recovery. Like disgorgement, restitution
generally "is measured by the amount of the fiduciary's gain rather than by
the amount of the beneficiary's lOSS.,,66
Still, courts' use of restitution to achieve equity and to reverse the
effects of "unjust enrichment" need not be pursued only through a profits-
relationship without finding a breach of a duty of loyalty); DEBORAH A. DEMOTT, FIDUCIARY
OBLIGATION, AGENCY AND PARTNERSHIP: DUTIES IN ONGOING BUSINESS RELATIONSHIPS 45-46
(1991).
62. See DAGAN, supra note 55, at 237 ("[R]estitution for breach of fiduciary duty is so
entrenched in Anglo-American law that it is rarely seriously disputed."); SHEPHERD, supra note 4, at
373 (claiming that "any comprehensive and effective theory of fiduciaries can be postulated as being
co-extensive with the law of restitution as a whole"); Smith, supra note 4, at 1408 (observing that "all
commentators seem to agree that breach of fiduciary duty falls within the boundaries of the law of
restitution").
63. Of course, a restitutionary remedy can also turn out to be less than expectancy.
64. 444 U.S. 507 (1980).
65. Id. at 510. In this case, the restitutionary remedy took the form of a constructive trust. Id. The
categories of disgorgement, constructive trust, and restitution overlap, and are not mutually exclusive
remedies. But since they are all discussed and deployed in connection with the enforcement of
fiduciary duties, it seems worthwhile to highlight all three. Some subtleties in the applications of these
remedies have been explored by JAMES EDELMAN, GAN-BASED DAMAGES: CONTRACT, TORT,
EQUITY AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 65-78 (2002); PETER JAFFEY, THE NATURE AND SCOPE OF
RESTITUTION: VITIATED TRANSFERS, IMPUTED CONTRACTS AND DISGORGEMENT 136-38 (2000);
Daniel Friedmann, Restitution for Wrongs: The Measure of Recovery, 79 TEX. L. REV. 1879, 1880-83
(2001).
66. Smith, supra note 4, at 1493.
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based remedy. Rather, through restitution, courts may require fiduciaries
to pay a fair price in an unfair transaction instead of disgorging their
profits. 67 Restitutionary remedies can also be contribution-based: a
beneficiary can be compensated in accordance with his contribution to an
enterprise. 68 Contribution-based restitutionary remedies undo the effects of
unjust enrichment in a retrospective way without focusing on profits or
prospective recovery per se. Although restitution-like disgorgement and
constructive trusts-is a remedy available to non-fiduciaries as well from
time to time, it is routinely linked to the fiduciary context.
Finally, punitive damages may be available in a suit for breach of
fiduciary duties even though they are not routinely available for breaches
of contract. Thus, above and beyond disgorgement and other forms of
restitution, punitive damages may be assessed as well when a breach is
extreme or a product of malice or fraud.69
D. The Fiduciary Concept
With this introduction to all things fiduciary in place, I can endeavor to
say something more general about the concept of the fiduciary that
underlies defining the relationship, erecting the set of duties to apply to
fiduciaries, and determining the appropriate remedy to exact from
fiduciaries in any given context. Although I cannot aim to settle the long-
standing disputes among those who seek grand unified theories of the
fiduciary concept 7 (and those who think no such unified theory is
67. See Stout, supra note 23, at 50. For an argument that fiduciaries should have to seek the "best
possible price" rather than a mere "fair price," see Lawrence E. Mitchell, Fairness and Trust in
Corporate Law, 43 DUKE L.J. 425,485-86 (1993).
68. For a discussion of contribution-based restitutionary remedies, see DAGAN, supra note 55, at
167-83.
69. See Keck v. Wacker, 413 F. Supp. 1377 (E.D. Ky. 1976); Scallen, supra note 4, at 912 (citing
Vale v. Union Bank, 151 Cal. Rptr. 784 (Ct. App. 1979)); Hylid v. Simmons, 378 A.2d 260 (N.J.
1977)); Cooter & Freedman, supra note 4, at 1069 (citing Schoenholtz v. Doniger, 657 F. Supp. 899,
914 (S.D.N.Y. 1987)).
70. For a sampling of this debate, see, for example, SHEPHERD, supra note 4 (defending an
account of fiduciaries as "entrustment" leading to "encumbered power" and rejecting property-based
theories, reliance-based accounts, contractarianism, unjust enrichment theories, and "power and
discretion theory"); Victor Brudney, Fiduciary Ideology in Transactions Affecting Corporate Control,
65 MICH. L. REv. 259, 259-60 (1966) (highlighting the role of the fiduciary as a representative);
Criddle, supra note 7, at 126 ("The starting point for all fiduciary relations is substitution .... ");
DeMott, supra note 16, at 926 ("[T]he law applicable to fiduciary duty can best be understood as
responsive to circumstances that justify the expectation that an actor's conduct will be loyal to the
interests of another."); Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 5, at 426 (defending a "contractarian" theory
in which fiduciary duties exist as default rules that result from the impossibility of writing complete
contracts); Frankel, supra note 4, at 808-16 (defending "abuse of power" as the unifying theme of
fiduciary law); Arthur J. Jacobson, The Private Use of Public Authority: Sovereignty and Associations
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possible),71 there are a few relatively uncontroversial propositions about
the concept upon which almost all could agree. My aim here is not to
rationalize or justify the bulk of the case law surrounding fiduciaries but
only to identify some of its organizing attributes. That will enable me to
assess whether the concept can be fruitfully applied to friendship.
It is common to observe that fiduciary relationships are relationships of
trust, where one party trusts another more than would be true in a standard
commercial transaction. This strong trust tends to result because of the
fiduciary's greater expertise in the interaction at issue (like a lawyer's
knowledge), greater control over assets (whether real property or
information), or high degree of influence over a beneficiary's decision-
making process.72 For this reason, when discussing the fiduciary concept,
courts often focus upon the fiduciary's "discretionary authority" or"power" over something a beneficiary owns (or over the beneficiary
himself) and look for resultant dependency or vulnerability in the
beneficiary.7 3 The degree of control, complexity, and dominance or the
broad range of the underlying relationship can also help direct courts in
in the Common Law, 29 BUFF. L. REv. 599, 620 (1980) (viewing the shifting of "judgment" as central
to the fiduciary concept); Edward B. Rock & Michael L. Wachter, Islands of Conscious Power: Law,
Norms, and the Self-Governing Corporation, 149 U. PA. L. REv. 1619, 1634-40 (2001) (arguing that
fiduciary duties are necessary to counteract temptations for opportunism that even strong social norms
will fail to deter); Austin W. Scott, The Fiduciary Principle, 37 CAL. L. REv. 539 (1949) (arguing that
fiduciaries can be united in their voluntary undertakings); Smith, supra note 4 (arguing for a "critical
resource theory" in which all fiduciaries have discretion to dispose of or have power over a
beneficiary's critical resource).
71. See, e.g., DeMott, supra note 4, at 915 ("Described instrumentally, the fiduciary obligation is
a device that enables the law to respond to a range of situations in which, for a variety of reasons, one
person's discretion ought to be controlled because of characteristics of that person's relationship with
another. This instrumental description is the only general assertion about fiduciary obligation that can
be sustained.").
72. See, e.g., Burdett v. Miller, 957 F.2d 1375, 1381 (7th Cir. 1992) (Posner, J.).
The common law imposes [a fiduciary] duty when the disparity between the parties in
knowledge or power relevant to the performance of an undertaking is... vast.... If a person
solicits another to trust him in matters in which he represents himself to be expert as well as
trustworthy and the other is not expert and accepts the offer and reposes complete trust in
him, a fiduciary relation is established. ... [T]he agent has (or claims to have) expert
knowledge the deployment of which the principal cannot monitor.
Id.; Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 5, at 426.
73. See, e.g., United States v. Chestman, 947 F.2d 551, 569 (2d Cir. 1991) ("A fiduciary
relationship involves discretionary authority and dependency .. "); Landskroner v. Landskroner, 797
N.E.2d 1002, 1013 (Ohio Ct. App. 2003) (finding fiduciary relationships to involve cases where"special confidence and trust is reposed" with resultant "superiority or influence"); DeMott, supra note
4, at 902 ("In many relationships in which one party is bound by a fiduciary obligation, the other
party's vulnerability ... justifies the imposition of fiduciary obligation."); Mitchell, supra note 4, at
1684 (focusing on power and dependency); Weinrib, supra note 4, at 4-5 (focusing upon a fiduciary's
discretion and controlling it).
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figuring out how strictly to enforce fiduciary duties and how to impose a
proper remedy.74 Still, the general duties and the menu of standard
remedies for breach of these duties illuminate something important about
the threshold of trust necessary to trigger a finding of the relationship in
the first place. This is why one must know something about the duties and
remedies before giving a full account of the sorts of relationships that the
law finds to be fiduciary.75
So what is notable about the fiduciary duties and remedies and how do
they help reveal the concept of the fiduciary that guides the finding of a
fiduciary relationship, the scrutinizing of their duties and obligation, and
the imposition of a remedy? Most importantly, they evidence special
concern with policing opportunism and discretion in contexts where
monitoring costs are very high and bonding is exceedingly important to
the functioning of the relationship. The duties are relatively stringent
because the fiduciary has easy access to important resources of her
beneficiary, and the remedies are supercompensatory in part to deter
misuse thereof and related misbehavior.76 The fiduciary relationship is one
especially susceptible to abuse because fiduciaries are especially difficult
to monitor.7 7
Irrespective of one's approach to understanding the fiduciary-whether
economic, moralistic, or doctrinal-most agree that the fiduciary concept
is one that aims to deter and denounce certain kinds of opportunistic
conduct in specialized relationships in which opportunism is relatively
easy to accomplish on account of direct access by the fiduciary to assets,
information, or judgment, accompanied by poor opportunities for
monitoring by the beneficiary.78 Because trust itself functions as the only
74. See Scallen, supra note 4, at 911 ("Because the fiduciary relationship is based in part upon
the concept of delegated discretion, the more discretion that must be delegated to the fiduciary, the
greater the scope of the fiduciary duty."); Scott & Scott, supra note 7, at 2422 ("[B]oundary of
fiduciary discretion.., varies in its strictness in different settings."); id. at 2424 ("[T]he more complex
and broad ranging is the fiduciary relationship, the more discretion is needed .. "); Smith, supra note
4, at 1482-84 (strictness, scope, and substance of the duty of loyalty varies with the power of the
fiduciary).
75. See Davis, supra note 4, at 3 (emphasizing enforcement as furnishing the key to the fiduciary
concept).
76. On fiduciary duties and remedies as a deterrent for opportunism, see, for example, Davis,
supra note 4, at 4; Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 5, at 441; Scallen, supra note 4, at 912; Scott &
Scott, supra note 7, at 2423; Smith, supra note 4, at 1405-06, 1487.
77. See DAGAN, supra note 55, at 236 (citing EDELMAN, supra note 65, at 85, 216, 244)
(focusing upon susceptibility for abuse in the fiduciary relationship).
78. This theme pervades the literature of fiduciary law and is highlighted in, for example,
Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, Trust, Trustworthiness, and the Behavioral Foundations of
Corporate Law, 149 U. PA. L. REv. 1735, 1754-55, 1782-83, 1785 (2001); Davis, supra note 4, at 4;
Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 5, at 441; Frankel, supra note 4, at 834; Lawrence E. Mitchell, The
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real monitoring (and bonding) device in the fiduciary context,79 courts
attempt to protect and promote the trust-and make sure it is not betrayed
too often. The remedies are one way courts signal to parties that they
should not betray trust; they aim to facilitate a beneficiary's reliance on the
trustworthiness of her fiduciary .80
To be sure, in many contexts, trust accomplishes its objective and
courts will try not to intrude upon the relationship excessively. For all the
talk of stringency in enforcing duties in fiduciary law, courts can be
notably passive and deferential to fiduciaries. But this should not be
surprising: the entire point of standing in a fiduciary relation to a
beneficiary is that the fiduciary is supposed to take on a special role of
judgment, representation, and control. 81 Nevertheless, it is just as true that
trust will facilitate taking advantage of the beneficiary, and accordingly,
fiduciary law is sensitive to the fragility of trust.
Another notable feature of fiduciary law is its unapologetic moralism,
which is revealed through the definition of the relevant relationships, the
contours of the concomitant obligations, and the imposition of the
remedies in any given context-apparent already in Meinhard. Although
parties may usually freely breach their contracts without any sermonizing
by the courts, breaches of fiduciary duties routinely meet with tones of
explicit opprobrium and disapproval. 82 When considering fiduciary law,
courts generally write as if they are importing moral requirements into the
law through their policing of fiduciary relationships.8 3 "[F]iduciary default
Importance of Being Trusted, 81 B.U. L. REV. 591, 597 (2001) ("[W]hen all of the careful analysis [i]s
said and done, it [i]s obvious that fiduciary obligation is about trust."); Ribstein, supra note 13, at 217
("[Fliduciary duties compensate for the [beneficiary's] inability directly to observe, evaluate, and
discipline the [fiduciary's] performance."); Scott & Scott, supra note 7, at 2420 ("[M]onitoring the
quality of the agent's performance may be difficult.... In general, the law characterizes as fiduciary
those agency relationships in which the principal is particularly vulnerable and unable fully to protect
and assert his own interests, thus providing the agent a peculiar opportunity and incentive either to
shirk or cheat."); Smith, supra note 4, at 1404-06.
79. On monitoring and bonding with agents, see Scott & Scott, supra note 7, at 2421-22.
80. See Frankel, supra note 4, at 824.
81. See, e.g., Scott & Scott, supra note 7, at 2419-20 ("Satisfactory [fiduciary] performance
demands considerable decisionmaking discretion ... ").
82. See Clark, supra note 4, at 75-76; Ribstein, supra note 13, at 237 (acknowledging "strong
language" in fiduciary duty cases); Stout, supra note 23, at 65 (observing that judicial opinions offer
"sermons" when applying fiduciary duty law).
83. See generally Cooter & Freedman, supra note 4, at 1073 ("Disloyalty brings moral
condemnation. The ponderous language of moral censure in fiduciary cases can wound the
defendant.") (footnotes omitted); FitzGibbon, supra note 4, at 338 ("Fiduciary relationships and
fiduciary duties reflect the precepts of social morality ...."); Frankel, supra note 4, at 829-30;
Mitchell, supra note 4, at 1692; Scott & Scott, supra note 7, at 2425 ("By establishing a standard of
performance that emphasizes heightened obligations of loyalty and integrity, and by the use of
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is treated as a moral violation with attendant reputational costs. '84 Writing
in moral terms not only leads courts to draw from the moral sphere and"use[] informal social norms to influence fiduciary behavior," 85 but it also"arguably help[s] create [and sustain] extralegal norms." 86 It accomplishes
this latter task by framing for actors what their conduct should be and by
expressing publicly and symbolically the norms of good behavior.
To be sure, Judge Frank Easterbrook and Daniel Fischel have famously
argued that fiduciary duties "have no moral footing," that moralistic
language appears in plenty of judicial decisions outside the fiduciary
context, and that a sound theory of the fiduciary concept must focus on
what courts actually do, not what they say.87 But it remains hard to ignore
the courts' own conception of what they are doing when they are
reviewing claims of fiduciary default. Indeed, even if Easterbrook and
Fischel are right that a grand unified theory of fiduciary law would need to
take stock of the actual practices of courts first and foremost, surely
rhetoric is relevant as well. If courts routinely speak in moralisms in the
fiduciary context-an empirical observation Easterbrook and Fischel do
not and cannot contest-that practice furnishes some insight into the legal
concept under consideration.
The apparent moralism of fiduciary law is also consistent with the
general concept identified here: a regime that seeks to support and
promote extralegal trust to police and monitor opportunism that could and
does occasionally result from easy access to beneficiary property,
information, or resources. The reinforcement of social norms through
moralized rhetoric and haphazard legal intrusion into the moral sphere is
of a piece with the entire corpus of fiduciary law. Fiduciary law, in fact,
relies on extralegal, morally altruistic behavior: "in practice [the fiduciary
duty] rules are open-ended standards that are only imperfectly and
incompletely enforced by legal sanctions. Nevertheless, we observe a
relatively high degree of compliance with fiduciary duty rules by U.S.
corporate insiders" because altruistic and morally-guided behavior is so
much the background upon which fiduciaries act.88 Further, the
"invocation of morality may compensate partially for the ineffectiveness
of market controls in [the fiduciary] context, since beneficiaries are
hortatory moral rhetoric, the law invokes a personal sense of moral obligation in the performance of
fiduciary duty.").
84. Scott & Scott, supra note 7, at 2425.
85. Id.
86. Ribstein, supra note 13, at 237.
87. See Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 5, at 427 & 428 n.6.
88. Stout, supra note 23, at 47-48.
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presumed less able to protect their interests than are parties in ordinary
commercial relationships." 89
It is widely known that "Meinhard's dictum still seems to be applied
broadly" 90 and that it is, as one commentator colorfully put it, "the oldest
war-horse in the repertoire of... fiduciary duty" with a potent influence
on fiduciary law.9 1 But, against this background, does it seem sensible to
apply the concept of the fiduciary to the friend?
II. THE FRIEND AND HER LIKENESS TO THE FIDUCIARY
Some have suggested that we are living in the age of the fiduciary and
that "we are witnessing the emergence of a society predominantly based
on fiduciary relations. 92 Indeed, some recognize the fiduciary concept to
have a "colonizing sway."93 Perhaps, then, the concept is ripe for
expansion into other areas of life, where it may be appropriately applied to
reinforce, sustain, and even create extralegal norms. Although some courts
stubbornly treat the fiduciary concept as a mere list to be applied to
particular cases, Ernest Weinrib has written that the "existence of a list of
nominate relations dulls the mind's sensitivity to the purposes for which
the list has evolved., 94 The list is meant to be illustrative, not exhaustive.
As Eileen Scallen has observed, courts have "attempted to formulate rigid
definitions of fiduciary relationships and the concomitant obligations as
though these concepts were uniform and unchanging. This may result in
an ephemeral illusion of certainty and predictability. It also misrepresents
fiduciary law. 9 5
Given the purposes I just highlighted in Part I, here I suggest that
friends should be more routinely considered fiduciaries for each other.
Certain parallels between the friend and the fiduciary are easy to see;
96
89. Scott & Scott, supra note 7, at 2425.
90. Ribstein, supra note 13, at 211.
91. Mitchell, supra note 4, at 1692-93.
92. Frankel, supra note 4, at 802; see also Kenneth M. Rosen, Introduction to the Meador
Lectures on Fiduciaries, 58 ALA. L. REv. 1041, 1042 (2007) ("Notions of fiduciaries and their duties
continue to permeate the law. Their importance only continues to grow.").
93. Weinrib, supra note 4, at 1.
94. Id. at 5.
95. Scallen, supra note 4, at 911.
96. For example, much has been written about the fiduciary's voluntarism-her taking upon
herself obligations voluntarily rather than their arising through relationships of status. See, e.g.,
SHEPHERD, supra note 4, at 100-01 (focusing upon the fiduciary's "acceptance" of her role); Frankel,
supra note 4, at 820-21 (noting that fiduciaries can avoid liability by avoiding the relationship in the
first place); Mitchell, supra note 4, at 1685 n.33 (discussing "the fiduciary's volition in entering into
the relationship"); Scallen, supra note 4, at 906 ("Th[e] element of choice-a willing acceptance [by
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others require more elaboration. In what follows, I focus upon trust, the
difficulty of monitoring friends, and the possibilities for opportunism
within friendships, which are all central to the fiduciary concept. Together,
these parallels counsel for courts to take seriously claims by close friends
that certain types of betrayals should be treated as breaches of fiduciary
duties and remediated accordingly. Of course, given the variety of
fiduciary relationships, duties, and remedies the law recognizes and
provides-and the reality that fiduciary duties can often be imposed on an
ad hoc basis97-recognizing friends as fiduciaries as a general matter will
not tell us very much about how, more specifically, the fiduciary
relationship of friendship should be policed. Those more specific details
are deferred until Part III, where I show how the law has already started to
treat friends as fiduciaries.
A. Trust and Friendship
In the first place, we tend to trust our friends especially (perhaps even
more than we trust our lawyers, whom the law will treat as our
fiduciaries!). They are our guardians, our counselors, our therapists, our
managers, our directors, our partners. As I have suggested previously after
reviewing the lengthy literature on friendship in multifarious disciplines,
trust is one of the defining attributes of friendship itself:
Friends tend to be trusting of one another and develop trust through
private disclosures, sincerity, loyalty, openness of self, and
authenticity. "What do we tell our friends?" Andrew Sullivan asks.
"We tell them everything. And we are not afraid of embarrassing
ourselves or boring each other." Yet perhaps this view is slightly
inflated: According to Graham Allan, "While there is a folk belief
the fiduciary] of office or specific obligation ... is essential to the imposition of liability for breach of
a fiduciary obligation."); Scott, supra note 70, at 540 (emphasizing the fiduciary's voluntariness). And
at the center of the literature on friendship is a focus on the voluntariness of the relationship (in
contradistinction to relationships of status). See, e.g., Scott Feld & William C. Carter, Foci of Activity
as Changing Contexts for Friendship, in PLACING FRiENDSIP IN CONTEXT 136, 136 (Rebecca G.
Adams & Graham Allan eds., 1998) (calling friendship the "most voluntary type of personal
relationship"); Allan Silver, Friendship and Trust as Moral Ideals: An Historical Approach, 30 EUR. J.
Soc. 274 (1989) (emphasizing friendship's voluntariness). Although this parallel is certainly more
interesting and important than the fact that fiduciary and friend both start with the letter f it is not
distinctive enough to mention in the main text: contractual relations are also quintessentially voluntary
and rejectable. This may mean that there are important parallels between contracts and friendships
too-but I will leave that subject for a different paper, provisionally entitled "Friendship as Relational
Contract."
97. See Burdett v. Miller, 957 F.2d 1375, 1381 (7th Cir. 1992).
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that total disclosure is the sign of real friendship, in reality friends
rarely know everything about one another." We often withhold
matters from our friends not because we do not trust them, but
because we know they are not fundamentally interested in all we
could share.
Perhaps trust is better defined as follows: "Trust is a belief that
another will fulfill his or her obligations and pull his or her weight
in [a] relationship. Symbolic gestures and experience create and
maintain trust. 9 8
To be sure, trust undoubtedly occurs between strangers in many
transactions. Trust at some level is necessary even for arms' length
transactions between standard contracting parties (hence good faith
standards that apply to all?), and "fictive" business friendships with some
heightened levels of trust are common.99 Indeed, one commentator has
gone as far as suggesting that "[a] lawyer who deals with contracts and
fails to understand the power and the limits of trust and the social
sanctions flowing from 'fictive friendships' is incompetent. '" 100
Still, friendship furnishes a paradigmatic case of trust and provides an
important benchmark for how trust can operate in an ideal relational
context. Without that important model, all relationships of trust might be
undermined. Humankind needs trust as a foundational good for societal
organization and survival.10 1 And "[t]rust is a notoriously vulnerable good,
easily wounded and not at all easily healed., 10 2 It thus behooves an area of
98. Leib, supra note 6, at 643 (quoting and citing, respectively, Allan Silver, Friendship and
Sincerity, 2003 SOZIALERSINN 123, 123; Dean Cocking & Jeanette Kennett, Friendship and the Self
108 ETHICS 502 (1998); ANDREW SULLIVAN, LOVE UNDETECTABLE: NOTES ON FRIENDSHIP, SEX,
AND SURVIVAL 216 (1998); GRAHAM ALLAN, FRIENDSHIP: DEVELOPING A SOCIOLOGICAL
PERSPECTIVE 107 (1989); 1 STEWART MACAULAY ET AL., CONTRACTS: LAW IN ACTION 230 n.3 (2d
ed. LexisNexis 2003) (1995)); see also ARISTOTLE, NICOMACHEAN ETHICS 215 (Terence Irwin trans.,
Hackett Pub. Co. 1985) (noting that trust arises in the highest type of firiendships); Silver, supra note
96 (focusing upon trust and friendship).
99. See Sally Falk Moore, Law and Social Change: The Semi-Autonomous Social Field as an
Appropriate Subject of Study, 7 LAW & SoC'Y REV. 719 (1973) (arguing that "fictive friendships"
support most business transactions in the United States: parties use informal modes of address,
exchange favors and gifts, and act "chummy"); Smith, supra note 4, at 1413-14 (trust exists in
standard business transactions).
100. 1 MACAULAY ET AL., supra note 98, at 230 n.3. But see ANNETTE C. BAIER, Trust and
Antitrust, in MORAL PREJUDICES: ESSAYS ON ETHICS 118 (1994) ("Trust in fellow contractors is a
limit case of trust, in which fewer risks are taken, for the sake of lesser goods.").
101. See BAIER, supra note 100, at 130 (citing 1 THE CORRESPONDENCE OF JOHN LOCKE 123 hr.
81 (E.S. de Beer ed., Oxford: Clarenden Press 1976)).
102. Id.
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law that self-consciously pursues the protection and promotion of trust in
society to remain sensitive to trust's paradigmatic case.
Why is trust-and protecting it-so important? Aside from
deontological ethical arguments that might stress that trust should not be
betrayed as a most basic moral requirement' °3 (and an additional
argument, of course, that the state must pursue what is moral in the
fiduciary context), one can emphasize, along with Francis Fukuyama, that
trust is one of the most important social virtues that can lead a nation
toward economic development and prosperity.10 4 If our capitalist economic
system is one to which our legal system must remain committed, it would
seem inadvisable to disrupt relationships of trust or fail to find a system of
preserving, sustaining, and promoting them. Indeed, precisely because
each economic transaction trades on trust to some degree, debasing trust in
society by failing to uphold the most basic standards of trust in
paradigmatic trust relationships would be counterproductive. 10 5 Of course,
one can become somewhat clich6d and alarmist about this too: "Trust is
the glue that binds couples, communities, and countries. Societies without
a sufficient wealth of trust cannot function efficiently, sometimes cannot
function at all."'10 6 Thus, a "legal system which neglected commitments of
loyalty would probably undermine" the economy and its own
sustainability.10 7 Still, these pronouncements are more than mere mantra.
Indeed, Justice Harlan Stone once blamed the Depression on the failure to
abide by fiduciary law:
103. For such an argument, see Thomas Scanlon, Promises and Practices, 19 PHIL. & PUB. AFF.
199 (1990). In some basic way, Charles Fried's canonical argument about contract law's internal
morality also puts trust at its center. See CHARLES FRIED, CONTRACT AS PROMISE: A THEORY OF
CONTRACTUAL OBLIGATION (1981).
Without a real peer in her league, the best philosopher of trust is Annette Baier. Her work on trust
is collected in BAIER, supra note 100, at 95-202 (containing the essays Trust and Antitrust; Trust and
Its Vulnerabilities; Sustaining Trust; and Trusting People).
104. See generally FRANCIS FUKUYAMA, TRUST: THE SOCIAL VIRTUES AND THE CREATION OF
PROSPERITY (1995). A similar line of argument is pursued in Lawrence E. Mitchell, Trust. Contract
Process., in PROGRESSIVE CORPORATE LAW 185 (Lawrence E. Mitchell ed., 1995).
For an important collection of essays on trust, see TRUST: MAKING AND BREAKING COOPERATIVE
RELATIONSHIPS (Diego Gambetta ed., 1988). Adam Seligman actually draws a nice distinction
between trust and confidence that might be relevant to the discussion here. See Adam B. Seligman,
Role Complexity, Risk, and the Emergence of Trust, 81 B.U. L. REV. 619 (2001); see also Niklas
Luhmann, Familiarity, Confidence, Trust: Problems and Alternatives, in TRUST: MAKING AND
BREAKING COOPERATIVE RELATIONSHIPS, supra, at 94, 97. But it would take me too far afield to
address Seligman's and Luhmann's interesting work on the subject. Finally, for some democratic
theorists' takes on trust, see DEMOCRACY AND TRUST (Mark E. Warren ed., 1999).
105. I discuss the more complicated relationship among friendship, trust, and the economy in
Leib, supra note 6, at 663-64, 666.
106. Christopher R. Leslie, Trust, Distrust, and Antitrust, 82 TEx. L. REV. 515, 517 (2004).
107. FitzGibbon, supra note 4, at 341.
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I venture to assert that when the history of the financial era which
has just drawn to a close comes to be written, most of its mistakes
and its major faults will be ascribed to the failure to observe the
fiduciary principle .... More than a century ago equity gave a
hospitable reception to that principle and the common law was not
slow to follow in giving it recognition. No thinking man can believe
that an economy built upon a business foundation can permanently
endure without some loyalty to that principle.1
08
In a more contemporary milieu, Larry Ribstein also identifies the
promotion of trust as central to fiduciary law and a prosperous society. He
highlights that the "disposition to trust is socially valuable because it
reduces the need for externally enforced constraints, and therefore the
costs of human interaction. Thus, a society in which trust in this sense
prevails may be wealthier than one in which it is absent." 10 9 Or consider a
slightly different argument presented by Robert Gordon: "[E]ncouraging
people to deal with one another as strangers progressively erodes the
underlying relations of solidarity, reciprocity, and trust upon which
capitalist economies essentially depend." 110 Accordingly, a fiduciary duty
law that ignores the exemplary trust that friends share risks undermining
the concept of fiduciary law itself, as well as the legal and economic
system it is supposed to serve and enrich.
Thus, the argument here is, at one level, simple (if not overly
simplistic). Friends, as a category, are paradigmatic exemplars of trust. As
Immanuel Kant wrote in his Lectures on Ethics, friendship is "man's
refuge in this world from his distrust of his fellows." ' And because
fiduciary law aims to protect and promote trust, fiduciary law should treat
friends as fiduciaries. 112 But a bit more can be said in favor of treating
friends as fiduciaries from the standpoint of the fiduciary concept's
concern with trust.
108. Harlan F. Stone, The Public Influence of the Bar, 48 HARV. L. REv. 1, 8-9 (1934).
109. Ribstein, supra note 13, at 228.
110. Robert W. Gordon, Macaulay, Macneil, and the Discovery of Solidarity and Power in
Contract Law, 1985 Wis. L. REv. 565, 578-79 (citing FRED HIRSCH, SOCIAL LIMITS TO GROWTH 84-
102 (1976); JOSEPH SCHUMPETER, CAPITALISM, SOCIALISM, AND DEMOCRACY 121-63 (1st ed. 1942);
Albert 0. Hirschman, Rival Interpretations of Market Society: Civilizing, Destructive, or Feeble?, 20
J. ECON. LITERATURE 1463 (1982)).
111. IMMANUEL KANT, LECTURES ON ETHICS 207 (L. Infield trans., 1963).
112. To be sure, "[t]rust is not always a good to be preserved.... If the enterprise is evil, a
producer of poisons, then the trust that improves its workings will also be evil, and decent people will
want to destroy, not protect, that form of trust." BALER, supra note 100, at 130-31. What this means for
a body of law self-consciously pursuing the protection of trust is that certain exceptions need to be
recognized. Those exceptions fall outside the scope of my general argument here.
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Another way to think about the concern for trust in the law of fiduciary
relations is to put the idea in a slightly different, but related, light. Instead
of seeing the fiduciary relationship as merely a relationship of special
entrustment, we might focus on the high costs of distrust in fiduciary
relations. Thus, parties in a fiduciary relationship require high degrees of
trust and must freely share confidences, secrets, and information for that
relationship to serve its purposes well. The doctor-patient and attorney-
client contexts are ones where it is obvious that the costs of distrust are
very high: doctors and attorneys cannot do their jobs well if patients and
clients are not forthcoming and revealing with them. And neither can
husbands and wives and partners (whether of the domestic sort or the
commercial kind) have very good relationships with too much distrust. If
we think these relationships have social value-and that the law should
contribute to helping produce and sustain that value-the law must help
facilitate trust and mitigate the high costs of distrust.
One way to optimize the fiduciary relationship, then, is to allow resort
to the legal sanctions associated with fiduciary duties to create a safe
environment for trust to flourish. 13 Because the costs of distrust are too
high, fiduciaries must be controlled by the law. Potentially more
important, however, than the actual enforcement of strong duties to target
distrust and betrayed trust directly is fiduciary law's "framing" function,
as Margaret Blair and Lynn Stout have called it.114 The gist of this idea is
that "fiduciary duty rules, and the strong language in judicial opinions
such as Meinhard, arguably help create extralegal norms."'115 In short,
fiduciary law is about signaling to fiduciaries that they ought not to be
self-interested in transactions with and for their beneficiaries; it is
generative of trust where costs of distrust are especially high.
Friendship is clearly a setting where costs of distrust are high. For a
friendship to function properly and to achieve the requisite intimacy to
enable it to be the source of so much pleasure and dignity,1 16 friends must
113. This discussion is based on Ribstein, supra note 13, at 228-29.
114. See generally Blair & Stout, supra note 78 (explaining and elaborating upon "framing"
theory).
115. Ribstein, supra note 13, at 237.
116. On intimacy in friendship, see Allan Silver, Friendship in Commercial Society: Eighteenth-
Century Social Theory and Modern Sociology, 95 AM. J. SOC. 1474, 1477 (1990) ("Friendship ...
turns on intimacy-the confident revelation of one's inner self to a trusted other .... "); see also
JOSEPH EPSTEIN, FRIENDSHIP: AN ExPOSt 40 (2006) ("[Olne of the things one looks for in a friend...
is the possibility of easy candor in conversation."); MICHEL DE MONTAIGNE, Of Friendship, in THE
COMPLETE ESSAYS OF MONTAIGNE 135, 136 (Donald M. Frame trans., 1958) ("Friendship feeds on
communication."). On the dignity furnished by friendship, see Leib, supra note 6, at 647, 662, 678
(citing RAY PAHL, ON FRIENDSHIP 153-54 (2000)).
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have a reliable trust between them. Friends cannot be friends at all without
disclosure, authenticity, and openness. Accordingly, it would be beneficial
for fiduciary duty law to signal to friends the standard of conduct
appropriate to their setting. To be sure, as Ribstein warns:
[L]awmakers must carefully choose the conduct they stigmatize.
The law may be ineffective if it tries to develop a norm that is too
far removed from existing perceptions of good behavior. Courts
squander their moral authority by condemning conduct that people
widely regard as being in the ordinary course of business.1
7
Yet friendship is certainly a context in which a norm of "good behavior" is
reasonably assumed, so stigmatizing the betrayal of close friends hardly
seems likely to squander a court's "moral authority." Indeed, quite the
reverse may be true: a court may be able to claim its moral authority only
by not turning a blind eye when close friends betray one another and
demean friendship itself. 118
B. The Problems of Monitoring and Opportunism in Friendship
As Part I revealed, the concept of the fiduciary concerns itself with
something other than mere trust. Although trust clearly sits at the center of
the concept, fiduciary law also has another related set of preoccupations:
trying to minimize monitoring costs in contexts where it is very difficult
for a beneficiary to supervise his fiduciary and policing the consequent
potential for opportunism. As Kenneth Davis once helpfully put it,
fiduciary law is in place to avoid having the beneficiary "looking over the
fiduciary's shoulder."1 1 9  Friendship, like the classic fiduciary
relationships, presents a context where monitoring is difficult, leading to a
high potential for opportunism.
117. Ribstein, supra note 13, at 237.
118. See Frankel, supra note 4, at 830 ("Th[e] moral theme is an important part of fiduciary law.
Loyalty, fidelity, faith, and honor form its basic vocabulary."). Seana Shiffrin has recently taken issue
with contract law for its divergence from moral norms and its potential for disabling moral agents from
doing their moral duties. See Seana Valentine Shiffrin, The Divergence of Contract and Promise, 120
HARV. L. REV. 708 (2007). Imagine her potential distaste for a fiduciary law that would so clearly
depart from our moral norms as to ignore the moral force of our obligations that stem from friendship.
She should be even more put off by a fiduciary law that fails to recognize friendship than she is by
contract law. Thus, the "divergence of fiduciary law and friendship," to play with her title, should be
even more disconcerting to her because a moral agent will not be able to compartmentalize as easily
(as she may sometimes be able to do in the context of contract law), given fiduciary law's self-
conscious infiltration into our moral lives and obligations.
119. Davis, supra note 4, at 6.
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Although courts often write as if there is a clear two-part test for
finding a confidential relationship-one that requires trust and
vulnerability, dominance, or influence-a high degree of trust, such as the
trust between close friends, necessarily leads to a substantial degree of
vulnerability. As Annette Baier argues, "When we trust we accept
vulnerability." 120 Indeed, the very concept of trust carries with it some
degree of vulnerability from the entrustor to the trustee. Baier goes further
too, foreshadowing my argument here about the friend as a fiduciary:121
Trust is an alternative to vigilance and ... trustworthiness is an
alternative to constant watching to see what one can and cannot get
away with, to recurrent calculations of costs and benefits. Trust is
accepted vulnerability to another's power to harm one, a power
inseparable from the power to look after some aspect of one's
good. 122
Obviously, this account of trust captures an intimate trust, not the
garden variety trust necessary for parties to a contract. 123 The trust in
Baier's account is one that can be shared only by people who genuinely
place their welfare into one another's hand.1 24 This kind of entrustment is
paradigmatically the trust we share with our close friends. Consider this
view-also Baier's-that sounds in the tones of fiduciary law quite
120. BAIER, supra note 100, at 132.
121. Although much of Baier's language is (unconsciously?) written in the rhetoric of fiduciary
law, and, thus, supports some of my argument in this Article, she would likely be very circumspect
about how I am using her philosophical treatment of trust for my ends. In the final analysis, I cannot
quite guess what she would think about my argument because although she values trust greatly, she
might find my efforts to juridify it between friends as excessively "contractarian." See, e.g., id. at 117
("It does not, then, seem at all plausible, once we think about actual moral relations in all their sad or
splendid variety, to model all of them on one rather special one, the relation between promisor [and]
promise. We count on all sorts of people for all sorts of vital things, without any contracts, explicit or
implicit ... ").
122. Id. at 133. Although she suggests that trust is an alternative to the threat of legal sanctions in
this quote too, I shall take issue with the "substitutional" nature of trust (for law) in what follows.
Indeed, fiduciary law is ordered to protect trust precisely by enabling legal sanction for major
defections.
123. Larry Mitchell argues that contracts do not require interpersonal trust at all-only "trust in
the system itself" Mitchell, supra note 104, at 196. 1 think this goes too far. For accounts of contract
that seems to rely on interpersonal trust beyond trust in "the system," see FRIED, supra note 103, at 8;
Daniel Markovits, Contract and Collaboration, 113 YALE L.J. 1417 (2004).
124. See Mitchell, supra note 104, at 192 ("[I]n a trust relationship, whether because of pragmatic
reasons ... or ... partially pragmatic and partially affective reasons ... we choose to relinquish some
of' our "measure of control over the trusted person by contract, or by constant monitoring.")
(emphasis added) (citing Annette Baier, Trust and Its Vulnerabilities, in 13 TANNER LECTURES ON
HUMAN VALUES 109, 112 (Goethe B. Peterson ed., 1997); NIKLAS LuHMANN, TRUST AND POWER
(1979)).
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directly: "[T]o trust is to give discretionary powers to the trusted, to let the
trusted decide how ... one's welfare is best advanced, to delay the
accounting for a while, to be willing to wait to see how the trusted has
advanced one's welfare." 125
What this form of trust between close friends shows-for this kind of
trust is most evident between such intimates126 -is that the concerns of
fiduciary law with monitoring and opportunism are very much relevant
between trusting friends. This is especially so because of the broadness of
the delegation of discretionary authority between close friends. Baier
again: "The assurance typically given (implicitly or explicitly) by the
[friend] who invites our trust, unlike that typically given in that peculiar
case of ... promise or contract, is not assurance of some very specific
action or set of actions, but assurance simply that the trusting's welfare is
... in good hands. 127 In differentiating the paradigmatic case of trusting
friends from the lesser form of trust between contract partners, Baier gets
at the heart of why friends are our fiduciaries:
[C]ases of trust in people to do their job conscientiously and not to
take the opportunity to do us harm once we put things we value into
their hands are different from [cases in which we put] trust in
people to keep their promises in part because of the very
indefiniteness of what we are counting on them to do or not to do. 128
Thus, Baier connects the core case of trust in a friendship to the
concerns of fiduciary law: discretionary authority that is difficult to
monitor or supervise that leads to the ability of the fiduciary to harm her
beneficiary opportunistically. This difficulty of supervision and
monitoring stems in some measure from the impossibility of being fully
125. BALER, supra note 100, at 136. See also id. at 138 ("To trust is to let another think about and
take action to protect and advance something the truster cares about, to let the trusted care for what
one cares about.").
126. To be sure, Baier does not limit her theory of trust to trust between friends. Although her
account is central to my thesis here, I am appropriating her remarks in ways they were not intended.
For her, the trust of parent and child is as "standard" an example as the trust between friends. Id. at
147. And she is suspicious of limiting trust to trust between friends (and in families) because such a
concept of trust would too neatly assume that we can police the distinction between egoistic and
altruistic motivations. Id. at 155. For theorists who arguably put the trust between friends at the very
center of the concept of trust itself, see Keith Hart, Kinship, Contract, and Trust: The Economic
Organization of Migrants in an African City Slum, in TRUST: MAKING AND BREAKING COOPERATIVE
RELATIONSHIPS, supra note 104, at 176, 178; Geoffrey Hawthorn, Three Ironies in Trust, in TRUST:
MAKING AND BREAKING COOPERATIVE RELATIONSHIPS, supra note 104, at 111, 112-14.
127. BAIER, supra note 100, at 137.
128. Id. at 117.
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clear about what set of actions a friend must take or refrain from taking in
her role as a friend.
This last characterization resonates with Easterbrook and Fischel's
famous depiction of fiduciary relations as domains in which it would be
nearly impossible for parties to specify their obligations in a contract
because the scope of the relationship is too complex and embraces too
many details about which the beneficiary could not negotiate well. 129
Although some focus on the expertise fiduciaries have in many fiduciary
relationships to explain why it is hard to form complete contracts with
them, it is now generally well understood that expertise serves as a proxy
for a more basic attribute of the relationship: that fiduciaries cultivate their
discretion on a trust that cannot easily be monitored or supervised and that
can lead to opportunistic abuse. 130
That this dynamic is typical in friendship cannot be seriously
questioned. As Baier suggests, with friends, "[w]e have no choice but to
entrust them with some matters, where constant checking on performance
is either impractical or undesirable. '" 131 We cannot always ask our friends
if they are betraying our confidences: asking such questions, supervising
our intimates regularly, and raising the prospect of distrust does much to
degrade trust and to prevent it from forming in the first place. We do not
specify detailed contracts with our friends because giving them a wide
berth of discretion is itself an act of friendship. Indeed, it is constitutive of
friendship not to demand complete preagreement on every detail of
friendly performance. But for just that reason, it is difficult to supervise
them. We cannot keep too careful tabs with our friends, since that would
itself betray intimacy. 13
2
129. See Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 5, at 426, 427; see also Cooter & Freedman, supra
note 4, at 1048 ("In fiduciary relationships ... the parties are unable to foresee the conditions under
which one act produces better results than another."). But see Smith, supra note 4, at 1428-29 (arguing
that "incomplete contracts are ubiquitous, but fiduciary duties are imposed only in a subset of those
relationships."). Smith is, of course, right that the difficulty of fully contracting cannot be the sine qua
non of the fiduciary relationship, but it is an important factor nevertheless.
130. See Burdett v. Miller, 957 F.2d 1375, 1381 (7th Cir. 1992) (Posner, J.) (explaining that
expertise often gets inappropriately emphasized instead of the invitation by the fiduciary to trust her in
a domain where the beneficiary is likely to rely on and be unable to question the fiduciary's judgment
or to monitor her activities).
131. BAIER, supra note 100, at 139.
132. See ROBERT C. ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LAW: How NEIGHBORS SETTLE DISPUTES 236
(1991) ("Close friends have such a long future ahead of them that they need not worry about minor
imbalances in the reciprocated favors between them. Therefore, a person who mentions that accounts
have fallen a bit out of balance indicates either a lack of intimacy or some skepticism about future
solidarity.").
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Of course, the mere possibility for opportunism is a thin reed upon
which to hang substantial fiduciary duties with unusual remedies. And,
indeed, in the case of friendship, one might think that there would be a
very high degree of compliance with the norms of friendship, such that no
legally enforceable duties would be necessary. Whether because of
reputational harms that bad friends suffer or owing to the mere power of
the norms internal to friendship and the personal guilt associated with
being a bad friend, one might predict a high degree of compliance with
friendship's internal morality. 133
Honestly, I have not the faintest clue as to how often friends betray a
counterpart, leading to a profit or loss that could plausibly be the basis of a
court action. But given that the court reporters are full of such cases (a
sample of which will be discussed in Part 111), 134 compliance is surely far
from perfect. More importantly, however, a high degree of "extralegal"
compliance with potential fiduciary norms does not make a decisive case
against the imposition of legal sanctions, especially in an environment
where legal enforcement would be imperfect, even if it were available.
Indeed, it is widely known that corporate fiduciaries demonstrate a high
rate of compliance, notwithstanding imperfect enforcement of fiduciary
duties and their inside opportunities for looting and opportunistic
behavior. 135 Thus, there is a role for fiduciary law even in a context in
which we already see compliant behavior and in which it would be hard
for the law to do a great job of intervening:
[I]f we want to encourage individuals to follow imperfectly
enforced ... fiduciary duty rules, it might be extremely useful to
find some person or organization that has the sort of authority.., to
"instruct" them that they ought to behave in an other-regarding
fashion, and to explain exactly which "other" they ought to be
serving. Interestingly, a number of corporate theorists have
suggested that this is the role played by the Delaware [courts],
whose judicial opinions encourage corporate insiders to serve the
interests of the firm and its shareholders not primarily by
threatening them with the prospect of personal liability, but by
133. See EPSTEIN, supra note 116, at 69 ("Whatever else it has to do with, friendship entails
obligation-sometimes ample and demanding, sometimes miniscule and subtle, but always, I believe,
present.").
134. A rough measure: A search in LexisNexis's "Federal & State Combined" database for cases
in which "friendship" is a "core term" produced 1,359 case results on December 26, 2007.
135. See Stout, supra note 23, at 48.
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offering "sermons" on the proper deportment of corporate officers,
directors, and controlling shareholders. 1
36
Courts could serve the same function in the context of friendship.
Admittedly, this signaling is somewhat easier to communicate to corporate
directors, who probably consult lawyers somewhat more often than friends
do. 137 But I doubt it is true that people only learn that the law controls their
conduct (and, accordingly, conform their conduct to the legal norms)
through lawyers or legal research. Many of us generally hope the criminal
law deters crime even though an "average" criminal probably does not
consult with a lawyer or law books before committing a crime.
138
Something about the justice system's coercive enforcement mechanisms
penetrates into society to help members control their conduct. There is
nothing very mysterious about this either: information about coercion
trickles down somewhat easily. So even though the signaling the Delaware
courts can achieve in the corporate context is probably more efficient,
there is no reason to think that signaling cannot also function properly in
the friendship context. Indeed, friends probably do consult lawyers in
many of the sorts of cases to which fiduciary duties would apply. When
we sell our businesses or our homes to our friends, we may very well get
lawyers involved. Many of the cases I cite as examples of the friendship-
fiduciary contexts the law has encountered in Part III actually seem like
ones in which parties would traditionally be represented by counsel. And
in the hypothetical with which I begin this Article, when David sells out
John to Daniel for a million dollar consulting agreement, David may very
well choose to get representation. In these sorts of cases, lawyers would
better know how to instruct their clients to behave if only courts would be
consistent about the role of friendship in fiduciary law. Even if courts and
policy makers ultimately choose not to prefer the cases I do here, some
more consistent treatment would help all parties plan their transactions
more reliably.
136. Id. at 65 (citations omitted).
137. I thank Brett McDonnell for pushing me on this point.
138. But see Paul H. Robinson & John M. Darley, Does Criminal Law Deter? A Behavioral
Science Investigation, 24 OXFoRD J. LEGAL STUD. 173 (2004) (answering no). Even if the law does
not deter, there is still the underlying ex post moral rationale for exacting punishment from those who
breach their fiduciary obligations. And there is the "empirical desert" argument available as well-that
it breeds general compliance with the law to police conduct that the community agrees "deserves"
sanction. See generally Janice Nadler, Flouting the Law, 83 TEX. L. REV. 1399 (2005) (arguing that
harmonizing law and social norms can help to breed compliance-and the opposite can breed
noncompliance); Paul H. Robinson & John M. Darley, The Utility of Desert, 91 Nw. U. L. REV. 453
(1997) (same).
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C. The Friend as a Moral Fiduciary
Above, I have made my preliminary case for why the friend seems to
fit comfortably within the legal concept of the fiduciary. There are certain
objections, of course, which would highlight the misfit between the friend
and the fiduciary and might show why even if the relationship of
friendship were to come within the concept of the fiduciary, it would be a
bad idea to impose fiduciary duties upon friends as a matter of law. I shall
address some of these objections in Part IV. Yet to come in Part III are
details about how courts already have come to appreciate the role of our
friends as legal fiduciaries and more specifics about how the law could
actually accomplish integration of the friend as a fiduciary.
But here I pause to make clear a different aspect of my argument about
treating friends as fiduciaries. Quite apart from what the law does about
our friendships, 139 friendships themselves stand much to gain if friends
began thinking of their moral duties to one another through the lens of
fiduciary obligation. Much, of course, has been written in our
philosophical, literary, and cultural tradition about the relationship of
friendship. 14 However, relatively little has been written about the special
code of ethics involved in friendship.1 41 Moreover, even when ethicists do
write about the morality of friendship, it is usually to question the
implications such special regard has for universalist moralities or to
defend the right we have to treat our friends with special care. 142 The
139. If the suggestion seems odd, see Leib, supra note 6, for a lengthy defense of my entire
research agenda in "friendship and the law."
140. I have cataloged and discussed much of this literature elsewhere. See id. at 633-35 nn.9-18,
674-80.
141. But see Jeanette Kennett & Steve Matthews, What's the Buzz? Undercover Marketing and
the Corruption of Friendship, 25 J. APPLIED PHIL. 2, 9 (2008).
142. See, e.g., LAWRENCE A. BLUM, FRIENDSHIP, ALTRUISM AND MORALITY (1980); TROY A.
JOLLIMORE, FRIENDSHIP AND AGENT-RELATIVE MORALITY (2001); SHELLY KAGAN, THE LIMITS OF
MORALITY 367-68 (1989); David B. Annis, The Meaning, Value, and Duties of Friendship, 24 AM.
PHIL. Q. 349 (1987); Neera Kapur Badhwar, Friends as Ends in Themselves, 48 PHIL. &
PHENOMENOLOGICAL RES. 1 (1987); Marcia Baron, Impartiality and Friendship, 101 ETHICS 836
(1991); Dean Cocking & Jeanette Kennett, Friendship and Moral Danger, 97 J. PHIL. 278, 286 (2000);
Dean Cocking & Justin Oakley, Indirect Consequentialism, Friendship, and the Problem of
Alienation, 106 ETHICS 86 (1995); John Cottingham, Partiality, Favouritism, and Morality, 36 PHIL.
Q. 357 (1986); Simon Keller, Friendship andBelief 33 PHIL. PAPERS 329 (2004); Niko Kolodny, Do
Associative Duties Matter?, 10 J. POL. PHIL. 250, 250 (2002); Peter Railton, Alienation,
Consequentialism, and the Demands of Morality, in CONSEQUENTIALISM AND ITS CRITICS 93, 98-99
(Samuel Scheffler ed., 1988); Sarah Stroud, Epistemic Partiality in Friendship, 116 ETHICS 498
(2006); Christopher Heath Wellman, Friends, Compatriots and Special Political Obligations, 29 POL.
THEORY 217 (2001); William H. Wilcox, Egoists, Consequentialists, and Their Friends, 16 PHIL. &
PUB. AFF. 73 (1987); Neera Badhwar Kapur, Why It Is Wrong to be Always Guided by the Best:
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presumption of the ethical writing on friendship that exists is that we may
be partial toward our friends, but it is rare that our ethicists expound on the
nature and scope of the partiality that can be expected of our friends.
This Article-by placing fiduciary law and friendship side-by-side-
suggests that we might achieve moral guidance within our friendships by
taking seriously the "friend-as-fiduciary" model it defends. Consider some
of the prototypical duties the law imposes upon fiduciaries, enumerated
and explored in Part I: the duty of loyalty, the duty of care, the duty of
utmost candor and disclosure, the duty of confidentiality, and the duty of
good faith and faith dealing. These are, taken together, excellent rules of
thumb in our interactions with our friends. Even if they are relatively
nonspecific, they have enough content to guide us and give some contours
to the nature of friends' responsibilities to their counterparts.
We must be unselfish with our close friends, acting in ways that
promote their best interests. We must affirmatively and diligently aim to
serve their welfare without negligence. We must be straight with our
friends and try not to obtain unreasonable advantages at their expense. We
should not steal business opportunities that come from within the
relationship. We should not unduly influence our friends to act in a way at
odds with their interests. We must keep and respect their confidences. We
must try to avoid conflicts of interest between our personal gain and our
duties to our friends. And we must deal with our friends fairly, often
showing them special levels of good faith beyond how we might treat
strangers. These are deeply important moral guidelines-and although
they are not terribly controversial, seeing friends as fiduciaries puts in
clear relief the moral duties we owe our friends. Thinking about our role as
friends through the lens of fiduciary duties could help us become better
and more reliable friends.
Thus, even supposing the friend-as-legal-fiduciary argument fails, there
is much to be gained by thinking of the friend as a moral fiduciary. As this
Part has revealed, friends share a paradigmatic form of trust: trust is
reposed in us as friends, resulting in tremendous vulnerability and
potential for opportunism. 143 Understanding this exposure-an exposure
Consequentialism and Friendship, 101 ETFUCS 483 (1991); Andrew Mason, Special Obligations to
Compatriots, 107 ETmCS 427 (1997); Susan Wolf, Morality and Partiality, 6 PHIL. PERSP. 243 (1992).
143. I explore many of the personal benefits friendship confers upon its participants in Leib, supra
note 6, at 654-57 (highlighting friendship's role in establishing and sustaining our identities,
confirming our sense of social and moral worth, helping us avoid depression, sustaining our physical
health, and inspiring creativity). It might be that we owe our friends special fiduciary-like duties not
(only) for the trust reposed in us and the consequent vulnerability it produces but (also) because of all
friends do for us in our lives. Still, the friend-as-fiduciary message of this Article helps expose the
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fiduciary law helps illuminate-might help us be more careful with our
friendships in our moral lives. This would be no small accomplishment,
even if legally enforceable fiduciary duties prove too unseemly for the
friendship context.
III. THE FRIEND AS A LEGAL FIDUCIARY?
Unseemly though it may be in theory, in practice courts have
considered friendship to trigger certain fiduciary duties. It would be
dishonest, however, not to acknowledge that courts are ambivalent and
inconsistent about their practices in considering friends as legal
fiduciaries. In this Part, I first survey the landscape, investigating what
courts have said and done about treating friends as fiduciaries. I then offer
a few specific recommendations about how courts ought to analyze cases
on a going-forward basis in which friends allege a breach of a fiduciary
duty based upon friendship.
A. The Law's Ambivalence About Friends as Fiduciaries
It is not hard to find cases in which courts disclaim the notion that
friends are fiduciaries for one another. Wilson v. Zorb144 is as clear as any
case-and makes the point well because the court went out of its way to
be explicit about the parties' "close friend[ship] for many years," noting
that they were "intimately associated in social activities. 145 The court
detailed how often the parties socialized and the nature of their
relationship, indicating that their personal relationship was distinct from
their professional relationship (they were both doctors, "consulted" with
each other, and shared patients). 146 Nevertheless, the court rejected the
claim that the friends stood in a fiduciary relationship to each other:
Warm friendship, confidence, and an affectionate regard for each
other were mutual with the parties, and yet each was self-sufficient,
competent, and independent... . Such relationships happily are
natural fit between a set of special responsibilities and duties to another and the nature of a trust
relationship, leading to special vulnerability. See also Gary Chartier, Friendship, Identity, and
Solidarity. An Approach to Rights in Plant Closing Cases, 16 RATIO JuRis 324, 330, 334-35 (2003)
(arguing that the core of friendship is vulnerability and that vulnerability creates certain special duties,
some enforceable by law); Kennett & Matthews, supra note 141, at 9 ("[F]riends are peculiarly
vulnerable to each other, and this we suggest generates an especially strict moral requirement against
using one's close friend as a mere means.").
144. 59 P.2d 593 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1936).
145. Id. at 594.
146. Id. at 596.
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common, but they are not confidential relationships in a legal sense.
It takes something more than friendship or confidence in the
professional skill and in the integrity and truthfulness of another to
establish a fiduciary relationship. 147
This conclusion is a common one: Kudokas v. Balkus148 and Vargas v.
Esquire, Inc. 149 are somewhat more recent cases that announce a similar
principle after conceding that the parties at issue were close friends. 150
Perhaps a more radical statement of the principle comes from a 1993 case,
Silvia Moroder Leon y Castillo v. Keck, Mahin & Cate: "[T]he trusting
friendship between [a] [p]laintiff[] and [defendant], however strong, does
not establish a fiduciary relationship. 15 1 Or, perhaps more explicitly, from
an 1881 Connecticut case, Hemingway v. Coleman:
We have before us a contract of sale, the parties to which are of full
mental capacity; the vendor believes the vendee to be her friend,
and that the friendship, dating from the time when he served her
husband as a laborer, has continued unbroken during the seven
years which had elapsed since that service terminated; and she
believes him to be honest because of his fidelity. Although friends
in fact, in law and equity they were strangers and stood at arms
length in the matter of contract; for friendship is unknown to law or
equity; in it neither finds any relation involving special confidence.
147. Id.
148. 103 Cal. Rptr. 318 (Ct. App. 1972). I discuss this case in Leib, supra note 6, at 688.
149. 166 F.2d 651, 653 (7th Cit. 1948). I also discuss this case in Leib, supra note 6, at 688.
150. See also Bennett v. Allstate Ins. Co., 753 F. Supp. 299, 303 (N.D. Cal. 1990) (rejecting a
longtime friendship as a confidential or fiduciary relationship); Kuper v. Spar, 176 B.R. 321, 329
(Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1994) (finding no authority for the proposition that a close friendship between the
parties could "transform[]" it into a fiduciary relationship for the purposes of the Bankruptcy Code);
Frantz v. Porter, 64 P. 92, 94 (Cal. 1901) (after conceding an intimate friendship between the parties,
holding that "the relation was neither more nor less than that of warm personal friendship, and there
can be no presumption, under the facts in this case," that a fiduciary relationship existed); Butts v.
Dragstrem, 349 So. 2d 1205, 1207 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1977) ("Dragstrem's primary justification for
his reliance upon Butts' representations was ... their close personal friendship .... Unfortunately for
Dragstrem's position such a relationship does not create a fiduciary ... relationship."); Cranwell v.
Oglesby, 12 N.E.2d 81 (Mass. 1937) (refusing to find that friendship could establish a fiduciary
relationship); Kratky v. Musil, 969 S.W.2d 371, 377-79 (Mo. Ct. App. 1998) (rejecting claim of a
"long-time" friend that the friendship established a confidential relationship); Snyder v. Webb, No.
97APE09-1248, 1998 Ohio App. LEXIS 2776, at * 12 (Ohio Ct. App. June 18, 1998) (same); Bush v.
Stone, 500 S.W.2d 885, 894 (Tex. App. 1973) (Bissett, J., dissenting) ("Friendship alone does not
establish a fiduciary relationship ....").
151. 873 F. Supp. 12, 15 (S.D. Tex. 1993). Other courts have been just as dismissive. See Neely v.
Martin, No. C052198, 2007 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 2322, at *10, *11 n.3 (Cal. Ct. App. Mar. 22,
2007) (denying that a "20-year friendship" gave rise to a fiduciary relationship, although
acknowledging that "a confidential relationship may arise from a friendship").
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He had not by being a friend become the guardian of her interests in
any such sense as to impose upon him a legal duty to sacrifice his
own to theirs. 1
52
Often, however, courts get more specific in their refusal to recognize
friendships as fiduciary relationships, rather than relying on broad
pronouncements about friendship's immunity from the law. They often
specify that "mere" friendship-or friendship "alone"-is insufficient to
trigger a fiduciary relationship. In short, the idea is that friendships can
exist among the relationships court will consider fiduciary or confidential
but that the friendship itself cannot be the predicate upon which a fiduciary
relationship can be established. This idea is routinely expressed by a
court's looking for additional evidence of "undue influence" or
"dominance" within the relationship to trigger the fiduciary duties. 153
But not all courts would be uncomfortable with my attempt here to
defend the idea that the friend deserves to be treated as a fiduciary. For
example, Thompson v. Thompson, a 1928 California case, held that
"[f]iduciary relations are not found solely in those legal relationships, such
as guardian and ward, husband and wife, trustee and beneficiary, but are
also found where in fact the relation of trust and confidence exists between
trusting friends." 154 Other California courts have similarly recognized that
"friendship, affection, and a close relationship" are sufficient to trigger
152. 49 Conn. 390, 392 (1881). Accord Worobey v. Sibieth, 71 A.2d 80 (Conn. 1949); Wells v.
Houston, 57 S.W. 584, 595 (Tex. Civ. App. 1900) ("Although friends in fact, in law and equity the
parties were strangers, and stood at arm's length in the matter of contract. Friendship is unknown to
law or equity, and in it, neither finds any relation involving special confidence.").
153. See, e.g., Konja v. Rezai, No. D033904, 2002 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 5331, at *43 (Cal.
Ct. App. June 14, 2002) (finding plaintiff to have made up his own mind, so friendship could not be
predicate for fiduciary relationship); Schultz v. Steinberg, 5 Cal. Rptr. 890, 893-94 (Ct. App. 1960)
("In the absence of a showing of the exercise of undue influence mere friendship does not constitute a
confidential relationship."); Hausfelder v. Security-First Nat'l Bank, 176 P.2d 84, 87 (Cal. Dist. Ct.
App. 1946) (same); Equitex, Inc. v. Ungar, 60 P.3d 746, 752 (Colo. Ct. App. 2002) (refusing to allow
friendship to serve as a predicate for a fiduciary relationship); Polletta v. Colucci, No. CV-95-
0125416S, 1996 Conn. Super. LEXIS 2519 (Conn. Super. Ct. Sept. 17, 1996) (same); Kurti v. Fox
Valley Radiologists, Ltd., 464 N.E.2d 1219, 123 (Ill. App. Ct. 1984) ("Even where a fiduciary
relationship does not exist as a matter of law, it may nonetheless arise where trust and confidence, by
reason of friendship, agency and experience, are reposed by one person in another so the latter gains
influence and superiority over the former. However, the existence of a friendship does not of itself
establish the existence of such a relationship .... ") (citation omitted); Grow v. Ind. Retired Teachers
Cmty., 271 N.E.2d 140, 143 (Ind. App. 1971) ("A confidential relationship may also arise because of
personal friendship and when one party knows that the other is relying upon him in such a manner. It
is essential that there be a dominant and a subordinate party, and ... that the alleged subordinate party
was justified in relying upon a relationship of trust and confidence."); In re Estate of Hill, No.
99CA2663, 2000 Ohio App. LEXIS 1201 (Ohio Ct. App. Mar. 15, 2000) (refusing to allow friendship
to serve as a predicate fiduciary relationship); Pfaffv. Petrie, 396 Ill. 44 (1947) (same).
154. 267 P. 375, 380 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1928).
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fiduciary obligations.155 Still another California case required of a friend
that she prove her utmost good faith to her friend, a standard reserved for
those in fiduciary relationships; the friendship itself served as the predicate
upon which to base the fiduciary obligation. 156 And a California court in
1972 explicitly wrote, "we have no difficulty in finding a fiduciary
relationship established ... by virtue of the long, intimate, personal
friendship of" the parties.157
California is not alone in recognizing the friend as a legal fiduciary.
Courts all over the nation have embraced the idea that a friendship can
trigger fiduciary obligations; 158 certainly, friendship is often listed among
the relationships that can be considered fiduciary.159 One court even
clearly specified that the fiduciary duty of good faith and fair dealing
requires friends to give each other a "fair price" in a transaction between
friends.160 Two other courts imposed constructive trusts-classic fiduciary
remedies-over the property of defendants in part because the defendants
stood in fiduciary relationships to their "close friends," whose property
155. Rieger v. Rich, 329 P.2d 770, 778 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1958) ("Suffice it to say that the
evidence clearly establishes that decedent reposed trust and confidence in the integrity and fidelity of
both appellants. These are the elements of a confidential or fiduciary relationship."); see also Ventura
v. Colgrove, 75 Cal. Rptr. 495 (Ct. App. 1968) (finding friendship to establish a confidential
relationship sufficient to trigger a duty to disclose); Dalakis v. Paras, 194 P.2d 730, 739 (Cal. Dist. Ct.
App. 1948) (finding a friendship to be sufficient to show a fiduciary relationship and to trigger trustee-
beneficiary duties).
156. Cox v. Schnerr, 156 P. 509, 512 (Cal. 1916).
157. Carpenter Found. v. Oakes, 103 Cal. Rptr. 368, 378 (Ct. App. 1972). However, the court
ultimately furnished the injured party whose confidentiality was breached with fairly modest remedies,
not a full disgorgement of the profits of the breaching party.
158. In Texas, for example, close, personal friendships are central in a court's consideration of
whether special fiduciary obligations apply. See Horton v. Robinson, 776 S.W.2d 260, 265 (Tex. App.
1989); Dominguez v. Brackney Enters., Inc., 756 S.W.2d 788, 791 (Tex. App. 1988); Garcia v. Fabela,
673 S.W.2d 933, 936-37 (Tex. App. 1984); Adickes v. Andreoli, 600 S.W.2d 939, 945-46 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1980); Kalb v. Norsworthy, 428 S.W.2d 701, 705 (Tex. Civ. App. 1968); Holland v. Lesesne,
350 S.W.2d 859, 861-62 (Tex. Civ. App. 1961). Texas courts also make a point of distinguishing
intimate friendships from mere business friendships that receive no special treatment. See Thigpen v.
Locke, 363 S.W.2d 247, 253 (Tex. 1962).
159. See, e.g., Dawson v. Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 157 N.W. 929, 933 (Iowa 1916) ("The fiduciary
relation may exist wherever special confidence is reposed, whether the relationship be that of blood,
business, friendship, or association, by one person in another who are in a position to have and
exercise or do have and exercise influence over each other.") (emphasis added). Even the Restatement
of Trusts acknowledges that confidential relationships are "particularly likely to arise between family
members or close friends." RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 2 cmt. b(1) (2003); Brown v. Foulks,
657 P.2d 501, 506 (Kan. 1982) ("The term 'fiduciary relation' has reference to any relationship of
blood, business, friendship, or association in which one of the parties reposes special trust and
confidence in the other who is in a position to have and exercise influence over the first party.")
(emphasis added).
160. Frowen v. Blank, 425 A.2d 412, 417-18 (Pa. 1981) (holding that an elderly plaintiff was
entitled to a fair price from younger neighbors who befriended her).
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they misappropriated. 161 And another court found a friendship to support
the duty of good faith and the duty to act "with due regard to the interests
of the other party., 162 Although most courts will concede that a friendship
alone cannot trigger the responsibilities of a fiduciary relation, some will
still acknowledge that friendship "is often an important consideration and
undoubtedly furnishes a vantage ground for one is not likely to expect a
friend to deceive him into a bad bargain. As against a friend no shield is
worn nor sword drawn in defense. Friendship tends to disarm. 163
These latter set of cases basically adopt the perspective of this Article:
our close friends should be considered our legal fiduciaries. But one could
go further in treating friends as fiduciaries: a good friend's very status as a
close friend could implicate her counterpart's vulnerability, such that
perhaps courts should not need to pursue too carefully a separate second-
stage inquiry about dominance, superiority, or influence. Consider the In
re Estate of Long approach, a case which gestures toward this further step:
Mere friendship can result in a fiduciary relationship. "This position
of superiority may arise by reason of friendship, agency, or
experience."... Even a capable businessman may repose trust and
confidence in a friend or associate. Faith and confidence may be
reposed in a dominant party without entrusting much in the way of
business and financial affairs to that party. 164
In Long, the court makes explicit that "mere" friendship alone can lead to
the trust and vulnerability necessary to establish a fiduciary relationship,
which can, in turn, trigger all sorts of obligations and special remedies for
their breach.1 65 Although the determination of a fiduciary relationship
between friends will always need to remain a fact-based inquiry166 (for
161. Schwartz v. Houss, No. 21741/04, 2005 WL 579152 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Jan. 3, 2005); Cody v.
Gallow, 214 N.Y.S.2d 127 (Sup. Ct. 1961); see also Klein v. Shaw, 706 P.2d 1348 (Idaho Ct. App.
1985) (imposing constructive trust to enforce fiduciary duties that were traceable, in part, to
friendship).
162. Perry v. Jordan, 900 P.2d 335, 338 (Nev. 1995).
163. Meginnes v. McChesney, 160 N.W. 50, 52 (Iowa 1916); see also Field v. Oberwortmann,
144 N.E.2d 637, 639-40 (Ill. App. Ct. 1957) (considering friendship to be a relevant consideration in
finding parties to be in a fiduciary relationship).
164. 726 N.E.2d 187, 192-93 (Ill. App. Ct. 2000) (citation omitted) (emphasis added).
165. Id. at 192. But see Schaefer v. Conway, No. 2004AP690, 2005 Wisc. App. LEXIS 937, at *9
(Wisc. Ct. App. Oct. 26, 2005) ("Although it would be wonderful if parents, brothers, sisters, friends,
and relatives were required to treat each other with the utmost respect and care, and were worthy of the
trust attendant to such relationships, that is not case.").
166. See Carroll v. Daigle, 463 A.2d 885, 888 (N.H. 1983) (conceding that friendships may be
found to be fiduciary relationships but deferring to a fact-finder to make the determination as to
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there are many types of friendships and only a few will implicate the sort
of trust relationship so central to the fiduciary concept), 167 there is good
reason that courts should not hesitate to conclude that close friendships are
appropriate contexts in which to enforce fiduciary duties. 168 The friendship
itself, as Long recognizes, 169  can be the source of the requisite"superiority., 170
Indeed, some courts, when presented with a transaction that seems to
have been based in no small part on friendship, hold friends to fiduciary
duties even if the parties involved were both sophisticated. Thus, even if it
would be hard to say with a straight face that one friend "dominated"
another in a given context-a traditional consideration in fiduciary duty
cases-friendship itself can give rise to fiduciary duties. Consider in this
regard Gray v. Reeves:17
1
A point is made that Mr. Gray was a shrewd and successful business
man and ought not to have been misled by promises that, when
revealed in the courtroom, seem to be unreasonable. But [this
argument] overlook[s] an element which disarms caution; that is,
friendship .... The impulse that leads men to trust those in whom
they have confidence cannot be ignored by the courts... . Hence,
when men deal as friends and the one accepts that as true which, but
for the element of friendship, would put a man upon inquiry, the
law will protect him in his trust as certainly as it will deny him
whether the particular friendship between the parties rose to the level of a fiduciary relationship);
Wheelen v. Robinson, 381 A.2d 742, 745 (N.H. 1977) (same).
167. For a typology of different kinds of friendship, see Leib, supra note 6, at 638-52. Some may
be hesitant to embrace my argument here because I do little in this Article to guide the fact-based
inquiry about what sorts of friendships should "count." I have developed a multifactor test elsewhere,
and it might help courts and fact-finders grow less ad hoc in deciding whether a friendship is close
enough for fiduciary treatment. Id. at 638-47.
168. Courts often recognize that friendship can create a "special relationship," a prerequisite to
various other fiduciary-like duties such as the duty to rescue, see Farwell v. Keaton, 240 N.W.2d 217,
222 (Mich. 1976) (finding that friends may owe one another duties of rescue and including them
within the category of "special relationships"), and a prerequisite to preclusion of a usury defense by a
borrower in a loan context, see Hufnagel v. George, 135 F. Supp. 2d 406, 408 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) ("[A]'special relationship' is limited to a small class of relationships: attorney-client, fiduciary or trustee, or
a longstanding friendship or its equivalent."). See also Abramovitz v. Kew Realty Equities, Inc., 580
N.Y.S.2d 269 (Sup. Ct. 1992) (estopping a borrower from asserting usury defense owing to friendship
and special relationship that led to the loan). I discuss Farwell more extensively in Leib, supra note 6,
at 685-86.
169. Accord Connick v. Suzuki Motor Co., 675 N.E.2d 584, 593 (Ill. 1996) (holding that a"position of superiority may arise by reason of friendship").
170. But see Wells v. Houston, 57 S.W. 584, 595 (Tex. Cir. App. 1900) ("No superiority of one
person over the other can be presumed to exist from the relation of friendship.").
171. 125 P. 162 (Wash. 1912).
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relief if the personal relations of the parties are such that the dealing
is at arm's length.... To say that a man who is moved to part with
his money under such circumstances is to be held at arm's length is
to deny sustenance to the very root of society; to make friendship a
liability instead of an asset. 172
Bush v. Stone is another instance of a court focusing on a friendship to
create fiduciary obligations, notwithstanding a plaintiffs experience and
business sophistication. The majority held the defendant to fiduciary
standards because the parties "worked together, they had repeated business
contacts, and were close family-type friends." 173 The court emphasized
that "the plaintiff and defendant became close personal friends ... and
remained as such for ... 26 years. The plaintiff trusted the defendant the
same as if he were a member of his own family [and] [t]hey hunted,
visited, and had repeated social contacts together." 174 The friendship
supported certain rights for the beneficiary plaintiff, notwithstanding the
plaintiff s expertise in the type of transactions at issue.
Thus, courts have embraced the friend-as-fiduciary model in certain
contexts and rejected it in others. In some respects, this ambivalence
should not be surprising, for there are many ways of being friends. Not all
modalities of friendship raise the concerns with which fiduciary law is
preoccupied, and the reality of friendship's many forms virtually requires
a subtle fact-based analysis in any given friendship presented to a court.
We do have casual friendships, and it would be unreasonable for the law
to impose special duties upon us when we are little more than
acquaintances but do not want to or have not had the occasion to disclaim
friendship affirmatively. Ultimately, there will always need to be
something ad hoc about a court's determination of whether a friendship
172. Id. at 163. To be fair, the court does make something of the fact that one party was "an
experienced mining man" and "the other, shrewd and successful in the unemotional pursuit of trade,
but utterly ignorant of mines and mining." Id. But from the perspective of modem fiduciary law, it is
notable that both were experienced businesspeople with sophistication and that the friendship was so
important to the court's determination. Indeed, in later case law, Washington courts acknowledge the
continuing relevance of Gray by merely requiring a friendship to be sufficiently close to trigger
fiduciary duties of disclosure. See, e.g., Hood v. Cline, 212 P.2d 110, 116 (Wash. 1949) ("It is true
that, in some of our cases, notably [Gray], we have considered that intimate friendship may, under
certain circumstances, justify one in relaxing the standard of caution he would normally exercise in
business dealings. But nothing in the record before us shows that the alleged friendship in this case
was at all close."); see also Hollerith v. Gardner, No. 49505-4-1, 2002 Wash. App. LEXIS 1534, at *9
(Wash. Ct. App. July 8, 2002) ("We conclude the relationship between Hollerith and Gardner was an
arms length, professional business arrangement, not the type of friendship that 'disarms caution' and
thereby creates a fiduciary relationship.") (citing Gray, 125 P. 162).
173. 500 S.W.2d 885, 890 (Tex. Civ. App. 1973).
174. Id. at 887-88.
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rises to the level of a fiduciary relationship in any given context and it will
always be the beneficiary's burden to put forth clear and convincing
evidence of the nature of the friendship.175 That is true to the flexibility of
fiduciary law and to friendship's variety.
Notwithstanding the difficulty of making general pronouncements
about friendship and fiduciary law and how friendship should be
recognized by courts, however, there are a few more specific guidelines
that are worth considering to aid courts in integrating the friend-as-
fiduciary idea promulgated here into fiduciary law. As Justice Frankfurter
famously wrote, "[T]o say that a man is a fiduciary only begins analysis; it
gives direction to further inquiry. 176
B. How To Treat Friends as Legal Fiduciaries
Here I present five theses that, together, paint a fuller picture of my
friends-as-fiduciaries proposal. These are mere attempts to be more
concrete about how to implement the friends-as-fiduciary idea that
pervades this Article; they are not exhaustive rules. The first, to which I
have already alluded, is that courts should embrace the idea that close
friendships should be able to trigger certain fiduciary duties without a
separate showing of "dominance" or "undue influence." Second, a
corollary to the "business judgment rule" (which protects corporate
fiduciaries from too many suits on the basis of the duty of care) should
apply in the friendship context as well. Third, the duty of loyalty should
not be enforced too extremely; it should be the source of policing only
serious malfeasance, not every minor conflict of interest. Fourth, friends
should not be presumed to exercise undue influence as a matter of course;
when friends gift or devise property to their counterparts, the law should
erect a rebuttable presumption that with friendship comes goodwill. Fifth,
and finally, the sort of restitutionary remedy that the law should enforce
between friends when they breach their fiduciary duties should not always
be a full disgorgement of profit. Rather, courts should be open to
restitution for contribution, as they are in the context of suit between
cohabitants.
175. See, e.g., Schrager v. N. Cmty. Bank, 767 N.E.2d 376, 384 (Il. App. Ct. 2002).
176. SEC v. Chenery Corp., 318 U.S. 80, 85-86 (1943); see also Scallen, supra note 4, at 910
n.48 ("The disparate evolution of fiduciary obligations provides additional support for the claim that
labeling someone a 'fiduciary' does not charge him or her with the same 'bag of duties' and degree of
obligation imposed on all other categories of fiduciaries.").
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1. Close Friends Are Vulnerable to One Another
As discussed above, some courts have started to appreciate the
"disarming" nature of close friendship. These courts are on the right track
and should be emulated. When courts understand that certain types of
close friendships depend on vulnerability, they will no longer seek any
additional evidence of vulnerability or inferiority in trusting friendships.
Because there are many categories of friendship and types of friends, it
would be implausible to create a presumption that all friends are
fiduciaries for each other-but courts should be very careful before
announcing, as so many do, that "mere" friendship cannot serve as a
predicate for a fiduciary relationship. Courts are far from consistent on this
point and the survey of the evidence here suggests that friendship can
serve as predicate for a fiduciary relationship. Further, the normative
argument here suggests that friendship of a certain kind should be able to
serve as one; indeed, being true to fiduciary law may require it.17 7
To be sure, courts should not lose sight of what they are trying to do
through their application of fiduciary law and should not thoughtlessly add
a relationship to the list for rote application. But close friends should not
be immune from the grip of fiduciary law; their trust in one another should
be recognized as a paradigmatic form of trust that leads to vulnerability.1 78
177. There is, to be sure, a risk of circularity here. Ultimately, my proposal is only that certain
kinds of close friends should be treated as fiduciaries, not that all friends be treated as fiduciaries by
the law. And I argue here that when courts see examples of these close friends, they ought not pursue
any further the question of dominance and vulnerability. Yet little in this Article helps explain how
courts can identify close friends-and one reasonable conclusion might be that courts need to rely on
the old trust and vulnerability tests fiduciary law already uses.
Indeed, this Article does little to address this issue because from the very start it brackets how to
identify and characterize friendships. See supra note 6. Nevertheless, I have already written a more
general article about friendship and the law, which undertakes some of this ground-clearing work. See
Leib, supra note 6, at 638-53. Utilizing the multifactor test for friendship I develop elsewhere, courts
can conclude that a relationship calls for fiduciary treatment without resort to inquiries into
vulnerability and dominance. And even if they continue in assessing vulnerability and dominance, I
am hopeful that I have made the case here that close friendships are actually paradigmatic on that score
and should not be discounted or immunized from such an analysis.
178. But see ARISTOTLE, supra note 98, at 240, 234 (observing that when close friends trust each
other, the law should not intervene: "[S]ome cities do not allow legal actions ... but think that people
who have formed an arrangement on the basis of trust must put up with the outcome."). I explore
Aristotle's discussion of the law's relationship to friendship in Leib, supra note 6, at 652-53. See
generally infra Part IV for an assessment of the "crowding thesis."
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2. A "Friendship Judgment Rule"
Beyond the guidance the friends-as-fiduciaries idea can offer in
identifying fiduciary relationships, it can also help recommend the specific
duties that should flow from the relationship. As I highlighted earlier, the
panoply of fiduciary duties is implemented variously (in scope and
substance) depending on the relational context.
In the corporate law context, where the enforcement of fiduciary duties
is relatively lax (relative to the trustee-beneficiary context, for example),
corporate fiduciaries are presumed to have performed their duties of care
with due diligence. 179 This presumption is enshrined in "the business
judgment rule," which is "a presumption that in making a business
decision the directors of a corporation acted on an informed basis, in good
faith and in the honest belief that the action taken was in the best interests
of the company." 180 As summarized by Professors Scott, "[t]he business
judgment rule represents an implicit recognition that the more complex
and broad ranging is the fiduciary relationship, the more discretion is
needed and the more legal norms must be selectively deployed in concert
with other informal arrangements that also align the interests of the
parties." '18 1
In enforcing a friend's duty of care, it seems that the parallels with the
corporate law context warrant an analogous "friendship judgment rule."'1 82
Friends have extremely complex and broad-ranging relationships: the
duties of friendship are always underspecified and can always shift from
179. Fiduciary law also will presume fairness and a conflict-free transactional environment-
leading to upholding interested transactions by the fiduciary-so long as the fiduciary can show
certain forms of procedural fairness. See Mitchell, supra note 104, at 186, 189-90 (highlighting the
"fairness doctrine" in the fiduciary context and arguing that it erodes trust and community). In the
friendship context, however, it is quite hard to imagine what "procedural fairness" would look like. It
is much more plausible to proceed case-by-case in assessing fairness, rather than using presumptions
won through procedures.
180. Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984), cited in Scott & Scott, supra note 7, at
2423-24 & 2424 n.77.
181. Scott & Scott, supra note 7, at 2424. Mitchell concurs with this understanding of the business
judgment rule in Mitchell, supra note 104, at 192, and also emphasizes, beyond complexity, the
difficulty of assessing the "truth" about appropriate conduct in corporate enterprises. I suspect it is
largely true of friendship too that the truth of proper friend behavior is elusive and difficult to ascertain
with certainty.
182. Two other common rationales for the business judgment rule-that it induces risk taking and
that it protects the value of centralized decision making-have no obvious application in the friendship
context. In fact, they highlight the limits of the "friendship judgment rule" that I delineate here
precisely because we might very well want to promote less risky behavior when it comes to our
friendships and to discourage unilateral decision making. Thanks to Gordon Smith for appropriate
skepticism about these issues.
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under our feet. Friendships themselves are always organic, always in
motion, and always responsive to shifting realities. It is impossible to be
too exacting about what would count as meeting or violating a relevant
duty of care; the discretion friends need recommends deferring to the
judgment of friends unless departures from good behavior are manifest.
Obviously, there is a danger that the exception of a friendship judgment
rule might swallow the whole range of fiduciary duties that this Article
seeks to have imposed upon friends. It would be a hollow victory for my
agenda here if the enforcement of fiduciary duties in the context of
friendship mirrored the pattern we see in corporate law with very feeble
enforcement. 183 But aspects of the duty of candor, the duty of
confidentiality, the duty of utmost good faith and fair dealing, and the duty
of loyalty would remain enforceable, a friendship-judgment rule
notwithstanding. Even the duty of care could be found to be violated at the
extreme. In any case, as one court memorably put it, at "the heart of a...
fiduciary's duty is an attitude, not a rule." 184 And fiduciary law needs a
reorientation of its set of attitudes to be more sensitive to the fragility of
trust within friendships and to do its part to help sustain and promote trust
between friends.
3. Being Loyal to Friends
The duty of loyalty can be enforced very rigorously, allowing courts to
void all "interested" transactions and enabling courts to sanction any
fiduciary that does not always put her beneficiary's welfare as a first
priority.185 But it can be enforced more selectively too, having courts focus
mainly on bad acts of the fiduciary, on whether a fiduciary has
misappropriated opportunities that came to her on account of her status as
a fiduciary, on egregious self-dealing without consent of the principal, and
on unconsented-to competition with a principal. 186 This latter set of foci of
enforcing the duty of loyalty makes more sense in the context of
friendship.
The blurry lines within the morality of friendship that provide us with
only schematic guidance about how far we have to go to pursue our
friends' best interests-must we give them all the market information we
183. I thank Reza Dibadj for pushing me on this issue.
184. Chiles v. Robertson, 767 P.2d 903, 912 (Or. Ct. App. 1989).
185. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 170 (1959) (the duty of loyalty necessitates
a fiduciary to act solely in the interest of the beneficiary).
186. See generally FRANKLiNA. GEVURTZ, CORPORATION LAW 321-74 (2000).
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have at our disposal when we are competing for the same jobs?-suggest
that it would be very hard to require friends to be fully altruistic. 18 7 Indeed,
a "despotism of virtue" 188 might draw fiduciary law too far away from the
moral standards of conduct that give it its authority. Accordingly, a more
flexible and less stringent form of the duty of loyalty to govern friendships
is probably warranted.
There is also a neat analogy between friendship and the close
corporation context that counsels for less stringent enforcement of the duty
of loyalty in the friendship context. As Lawrence Mitchell argues, in close
corporations courts tend to employ "remedial approaches which focus on
the putative fiduciary's wrongful conduct" rather than on "prophylactic
fiduciary principles to prevent or resolve intra-corporate conflicts" or on
"the beneficiary's best interests." 189 The reason the application of the duty
of loyalty applies with somewhat less intensity in close corporations has to
do with the structure of ownership and control in that context:
The problem burdening fiduciary analysis in the law of close
corporations is that those considered fiduciaries in close
corporations are not, in fact, disinterested. They generally own
significant, if not controlling, amounts of the corporation's stock.
Thus, the fiduciary shares with the beneficiary a legitimate claim to
the "trust" property over which she has exclusive control. 190
Friendships share something in common with closely held
corporations. From one perspective, the "trust" property could be
considered the friendship itself, in which both parties have a critical
investment. Although somewhat counterintuitive, one can see that in the
context of a breach of a fiduciary duty of friendship part of what has been
misappropriated-the thing over which the friend fiduciary has
discretionary control-is the substance of the friendship.
187. In considering why friendship cannot be deemed purely altruistic, Annette Baier asks: "Is our
will to sustain friendships to be decreed egoistic to the extent that our concern for our friends is for
ones who are 'second selves' to us?" BALER, supra note 100, at 156. The idea of friends as "second
selves" is a dominant theme in the friendship literature. See, e.g., ARISTOTLE, supra note 98, at 260
("[A] friend is another ... self"); DE MONTAIGNE, supra note 116, at 141, 143 (arguing that friends
are of "one soul in two bodies," that they maintain a "fusion of... wills," and that friends are a"second self'). I discuss the potentially narcissistic elements of friendship in Leib, supra note 6, at
672-74.
188. The phrase is Roberto Unger's (though he applies it to a law of fiduciaries that would force
us to treat all our contract partners with heightened levels of solidarity and altruism). See Unger, supra
note 7, at 641.
189. Mitchell, supra note 4, at 1676.
190. Id. See also Mitchell, supra note 104, at 190 (discussing fiduciary law in the close
corporation context).
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Even if this lens onto the friend-as-fiduciary model is too distorting, the
parallels still work in the context of jointly formed business opportunities
or business-related confidences within a friendship. Take the example with
which I began: John and David's business plan, in which both had a stake,
was entrusted to David, who potentially misappropriated it by selling it to
Daniel without sharing proceeds with John.
Seen from these perspectives, friends stand in the same relationship to
the friendship as owner-directors in closely held corporations stand to
other shareholders. Accordingly, it may be appropriate, as in the closely
held corporation context, to "require proof of some form of affirmative
bad faith or intentional misconduct by the fiduciary." 191 As Mitchell
writes:
By shifting the inquiry from the beneficiary's best interests to a
more limited focus on the fiduciary's malfeasance, these tests
provide greater latitude than do traditional fiduciary principles for
... fiduciaries to pursue their own interests, and diminish the power
of the law to inspire and enforce high standards of business
ethics. 192
To be sure, Mitchell sees the relaxation of the duty of loyalty in the
closely held corporation context as violative of the very foundations of
fiduciary duty law's desire to force corporate insiders to behave in ways
different from the mere "morals of the marketplace. 19 3 But such a
relaxation of the duty of loyalty in the friendship context-if it can be
properly called a relaxation-should not erode any of the animating
purposes of fiduciary duty law. This is so because the focus on
malfeasance and bad faith in the friendship context will not be
circumscribed by the "morals of the marketplace;" the standards of good
faith and proper behavior will come not from the marketplace but from
ethical life more generally. The background and baseline are not the
marketplace but the love of friends.
4. Giving Friends Their Due
There is at least one area in the law of fiduciaries where it seems
inadvisable to treat the friend as a fiduciary: in the law of gifts and wills.
191. Mitchell, supra note 4, at 1677.
192. Id.
193. Id. at 1680-82 (quoting Meinhard v. Salmon, 164 N.E. 545, 546 (N.Y. 1928)).
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And, indeed, some courts have also recognized this exception to treating
friends as fiduciaries.
In the law of gifts and wills, when fiduciaries are named as donees in
transactional contexts in which they take part, 194 they are traditionally
required to prove that they have not unduly influenced the donor or
decedent in her choices about how to dispose of her property. The burden
of proof falls immediately upon the fiduciary-donee to make a showing of
utmost good faith and to prove an absence of undue influence. 195 If the law
more broadly embraced the friend-as-fiduciary model, it would likely
become much more difficult for donors to gift or bequeath property to
their friends. This result may be perverse, so any more systematic effort to
recognize the friend as a fiduciary should remain mindful that the
fiduciary burden of proof in the gift and will context should probably not
apply to friends, where good faith gift giving seems common.1 96
As it turns out, some courts have already recognized that preventing
friends from taking under a gift or will makes little sense, fiduciary law
notwithstanding. Indeed, sometimes courts will allow a friend to take a gift
or bequest without a requisite showing of utmost good faith and an
absence of undue influence, 197 even if the donee and donor are in an
established formal fiduciary relationship. For example, consider this
pronouncement of a Massachusetts appellate court in Markell v. Sidney B.
Pfeifer Foundation, Inc.:
Not infrequently an attorney will draft a will or do estate planning
work for a relative or close friend and associate; and in such a case,
if the attorney or a member of his immediate family is named as a
[donee], a court called upon to examine the transaction, although it
may suggest that the better practice would be for an independent
attorney to do such work, and although it may state that such a
transaction should be viewed with great circumspection, will not
apply to such a transaction the presumption of impropriety which is
194. I avoid calling fiduciaries set to take under a will or gift "beneficiaries" for obvious reasons
in this context: it might confuse readers because the relevant assumption here is that the donee (or,
beneficiary of the gift or will) is a fiduciary to the donor, herself a beneficiary of the fiduciary.
195. See, e.g., In re Estate of Long, 726 N.E.2d 187, 191 (Ill. App. Ct. 2000); In re Estate of
Moretti, 871 N.E.2d 493, 494 (Mass. App. Ct. 2007).
196. For the general argument about why the law ought to promote friendship (quite apart from
the relationship between the friend and the fiduciary), see Ethan J. Leib, Friends and the Law: Can
Public Policy Support the Institution of Friendship?, 145 POL'Y REV. 55 (2007).
197. In re Wharton's Will, 62 N.Y.S.2d 169, 172 (App. Div. 1946) ("Gratitude, esteem or
friendship which induces another to make testamentary disposition of property cannot ordinarily be
considered as arising from undue influence and all these motives are allowed to have full scope
without in any way affecting the validity of the act.").
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applied when dealing with one whose fiduciary status is
uncomplicated by ties of... close friendship.198
The court even furnishes a reason for this differential treatment of those in
fiduciary relationships (and double fiduciary relationships from the
perspective of the friend-as-fiduciary model, to boot):
The reason for the distinction is that, in the case of an exclusively
fiduciary relationship, it can reasonably be presumed that that
relationship influenced the transaction; and the policy of the law is
to favor the fiduciary's duty of loyalty and to discourage business or
donative transactions which inure to the personal benefit of the
fiduciary. But where there is also a relationship of... friendship,
gifts or other acts of generosity are natural and to be expected; in
such a setting the reason for the presumption of impropriety
dissolves. 199
Thus, friendship can provide a reason for generosity, such that gifts and
bequests between friends should not be held to the strict standards of other
attorney-fiduciaries. 200 These latter parties must show utmost good faith
and an absence of undue influence. Otherwise, their gifts and bequests will
be invalidated as a matter of law.
To be sure, not all courts agree that a close friendship in an otherwise
fiduciary relationship is sufficient to shift the burden of proof of undue
influence back to the contestant rather than it being laid squarely upon the
fiduciary to rebut a presumption of undue influence. 20 1 Indeed, Cleary v.
198. 402 N.E.2d 76, 94 (Mass. App. Ct. 1980) (internal quotation and citations omitted). The court
draws from other cases in which long-standing friendships were held to immunize a formal fiduciary
from inquiry into undue influence. See id. at 95 (citing Slater v. Munroe, 55 N.E.2d 15 (Mass. 1944)).
199. Id. (citations omitted). In Markell, however, the fiduciary was a "triple" fiduciary (a lawyer, a
nephew, and a manager of his aunt's financial affairs) and was ultimately held to have unduly
influenced the donor and taken advantage of her confidences.
200. See In re Crissy, 826 N.Y.S.2d 628 (App. Div. 2006) (allowing a lawyer of a testator to plead
a "pre-existing friendship" to explain a bequest and avoid the scrutiny to which he might have
otherwise been subject in probate); In re Estate of Smith, 411 P.2d 879 (Wash. 1966) (holding that
friendship explained a gift in a will to an attorney-fiduciary); In re Estate of Tank, 503 N.Y.S.2d 495,
497 (N.Y. Sur. Ct. 1986) ("If the attorney is a relative or friend of the decedent with a long-standing
relationship of friendship, the objective, rational basis of the gift is explained and the bequest allowed
to stand.") (citing Matter of Arnold, 479 N.Y.S.2d 924 (Sur. Ct. 1983); Matter of Annesley, 412
N.Y.S.2d 959 (Sur. Ct. 1979)); In re Wharton's Will, 62 N.Y.S.2d at 172 ("[T]he burden of proof on
[the issue of undue influence] does not shift but remains on the party who asserts its existence," even
where the principal beneficiary was the testatrix's own attorney, who was a family friend and drafted
the will).
201. See, e.g., In re Guardianship of Chandos, 504 P.2d 524 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1972) (holding that
donees who were friends with and living with infirm donor were guardians and fiduciaries of the
donor, so donor's gift deed gave rise to a presumption of constructive fraud).
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Cleary, a more recent decision of the Supreme Judicial Court of
Massachusetts, flatly rejects Markell, and holds that a "close relationship
[of friendship] should [not] shift the burden of proof back to a
contestant., 20 2 Still, even if it remains true (in Massachusetts, anyway) that
a formal fiduciary who is also a friend will still be subject to the
traditional fiduciary burden to rebut the presumption of undue influence,
the Cleary court simultaneously leaves open the possibility that, at least
for the purposes of gifts, trusts, and wills, a "friend is not usually a
fiduciary, and therefore the ordinary burden of proof applies. 20 3
Although it is likely that courts following Cleary would be required to
hold the friend to the special burden of the fiduciary if the law more
204generally recognized the friend as a fiduciary, one could still
disaggregate the general demarcation of a fiduciary relationship in
friendship and its attendant consequences. As I described earlier, calling a
relationship fiduciary does not generally mean that a standard set of duties
always applies. Rather, the law should allow our friends to receive gifts
and bequests in transactions in which they take part without having the
burden of proof to show their good faith and to rebut a presumption of
undue influence.20 5  Giving gifts is so quintessentially central to
friendship20 6 that it makes little sense to have the law look upon such gifts
201with any special suspicion.
202. 692 N.E.2d 955, 959 (Mass. 1998).
203. Id
204. Id. at 961 ("[T]he burden of proof is on the fiduciary.").
205. Even Massachusetts courts have expressed skepticism of Cleary. See Rempelakis v. Russell,
842 N.E.2d 970, 977 (Mass. App. Ct. 2006) ("Fiduciaries are often relatives or friends of the principal,
and thus frequently are natural objects of the principal's bounty. Indeed, it is the principal's feelings
for the fiduciary that many times result in both the choice of that individual to perform fiduciary
functions and the desire to reward the fiduciary in some manner. We think it a peculiar proposition that
this natural state of affairs should be presumed in all instances to be the product of sinister behavior on
the part of the fiduciary unless he proves otherwise."). Indeed, it is routine to find fiduciaries to be
engaging in undue influence when they isolate donors from close friends, who are presumed to have
the donor's best interest at heart. See, e.g., In re Estate of Moretti, 871 N.E.2d 493, 495, 500-01, 503
(Mass. App. Ct. 2007).
206. See Leib, supra note 6, at 645 (citing Jack L. Car & Janet T. Landa, The Economics of
Symbols, Clan Names, and Religion, 12 J. LEGAL STUD. 135, 156 (1983); Janet T. Landa, The Enigma
of the Kula Ring: Gift-Exchanges and Primitive Law and Order, 3 INT'L REV. L. & ECON. 137, 152-
56 (1983); Ian R. Macneil, Exchange Revisited- Individual Utility and Social Solidarity, 96 ETHICS
567, 568 (1986); ELLICKSON, supra note 132, at 167, 176-78, 235-36; MARCEL MAUSS, THE GIFT:
THE FORM AND REASON FOR EXCHANGE IN ARCHAIC SOCIETIES (W.D. Halls trans., 1990)); see also
Schwartz v. Garrett, 91 P.2d 535, 536 (Or. 1939) ("[I]t is a natural human instinct to reward friendship
and acts of kindness."). This view should resonate with some classic sociological and social
psychological perspectives on the gift. See RICHARD M. TITMUSS, THE GIFT RELATIONSHIP: FROM
HUMAN BLOOD TO SOCIAL POLICY 212 (1971) (discussing gifts as "creative altruism," helping us
realize ourselves through donating to others); Barry Schwartz, The Social Psychology of the Gift, 73
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5. Restituting Friends
Just as in cases of garden-variety breaches of fiduciary duty, there can
be no singular off-the-rack remedy when it comes to remediating breaches
of the fiduciary duties of friendship. "Restitution" is the broad name we
give to the equitable remedies for breaches of fiduciary duties. But, as I
suggested earlier, restitution comes in many forms and is not the exclusive
remedy for breaches of fiduciary duties.20 8 In some cases, a constructive
trust over some property seems to be the right remedy. In other cases, a
more thorough disgorgement of all profits seems more appropriate. But in
some cases of fraudulent misrepresentation, the only remedy might be
rescission or invalidation; and in other cases of more egregious conduct
breaching fiduciary duties, punitive damages might be awarded.
Sometimes simply paying a fair price might be sufficient to remedy a
conflicted transaction. And in the area of securities regulation, breaches of
the duty of confidentiality through misappropriation of material, nonpublic
information leads to both civil and criminal penalties. 20 9 Accordingly, it
AM. J. Soc. 1 (1967) (discussing the gift as, inter alia, a generator of identity and as a way to
encourage reciprocity and behavior).
207. Indeed, until very recently California recognized a "pre-existing friendship" exemption to its
custodial care provisions, CAL. PROB. CODE § 21350 (2008), which trigger the fiduciary burden of
proof every time a gift or bequest is made to someone who cares for a donor or decedent. See In re
Conservatorship of Estate of McDowell, 23 Cal. Rptr. 3d 10 (Ct. App. 2004) (friends should not need
to rebut a presumption of undue influence merely because they provide custodial care); In re
Conservatorship of Estate of Davidson, 6 Cal. Rptr. 3d 702 (Ct. App. 2003) (same). In 2006, however,
California abrogated the friendship exemption and now holds that friends who care for donors or
decedents will probably be subject to the fiduciary standard of proof even if they did not help to
prepare the gift or bequest instrument. See Bernard v. Foley, 139 P.3d 1196 (Cal. 2006). For limitation
on the standard in the case of attorneys, see Rempelakis, 842 N.E.2d at 977. For a recent analysis, see
generally Leib, supra note 6, at 697-99; Kirsten M. Kwasneski, Comment, The Danger of a Label:
How the Legal Interpretation of "Care Custodian" Can Frustrate a Testator's Wish to Make a Gift to
Personal Friend, 36 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REv. 269 (2006).
208. See supra Part I.C.
209. See United States v. O'Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 652 (1997) (holding that the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 and the rules promulgated to give it effect prohibit "misappropriat[ion of]
confidential information for securities trading purposes, in breach of a duty owed to the source of the
information"). For an argument that friendship should routinely be held to be a confidential
relationship for the purposes of misappropriation liability under the securities laws, see Ray J.
Grzebielski, Friends, Family, Fiduciaries: Personal Relationships as a Basis for Insider Trading
Violations, 51 CATH. U. L. REv. 467, 493 (2002) (concluding that "[t]he SEC should abandon any
inquiry into the quality of relationships with family members and friends, and should simply conclude
that they all involve relationships of trust and confidence" for the purposes of misappropriation
liability); Leib, supra note 6, at 692-94. Obviously, the friend-as-fiduciary model has ramifications for
securities law; this is not the place to explore them in detail. I should say that I have grown less
enthusiastic about using the criminal law to preserve and promote friendships, at least without more
formal entry mechanisms into such relationships. See generally Jennifer M. Collins, Ethan J. Leib, &
Dan Markel, Punishing Family Status, 88 B.U. L. REv. (forthcoming 2008).
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would not be sensible to focus on any particular remedy as the remedy
appropriate to breaches in the context of friendship.
But there is one form of restitution that might be recommended more
broadly, even if it will not fit well with every case. In particular, Hanoch
Dagan's discussion about "restitution in contexts of informal intimacy"
helps identify a particularly appealing form of remedy when a friend
breaches her fiduciary duties to her counterpart: contribution-based
restitution. 210 Dagan sees this as an especially useful remedy for the "legal
facilitation of relationships of long-term reciprocity" characterized neither
by "sheer pursuit of self-interest" nor pure "acts of good-samaritanism.
211
His vision links with a larger claim about the law's promotion of a "liberal
vision of community," in which citizens are encouraged voluntarily to
identify with people who share their values and ways of life in order to
maintain self-respect and a sense of being "at ease in the world., 212
Because friendships fit the bill-they are voluntaristic long-term
relationships of reciprocity that are neither fully altruistic nor egoistic and
they are sources of solidarity and identity 13-Dagan's preferred remedy
may be a useful guide in remediating breaches of the fiduciary duties of
friendship.
Dagan's particular form of restitutionary remedy that might be useful
in adjudicating allegations of breaches in the friendship context arises
most clearly in cohabitation cases, one of which also presents as a
friendship case of a sort. Dagan's recounting of the tale of Frambach v.
Dunihue214 sets the stage. A widower with seven children and a couple
with four children became close friends-so close, in fact, that they decide
to cohabit with their families over a nineteen-year period. Eventually, one
party asked the other to leave their joint home (though there is little
indication in the record for why the friendship came to a sudden end).
Although the trial court decided that the families and friends should share
210. See generally DAGAN, supra note 55, at 164-209. Not everyone in the legal academy has
been impressed with Dagan's discussion in this part of his book. See Mark P. Gergen, A Thoroughly
Modern Theory of Restitution: The Law and Ethics of Restitution, 84 TEx. L. REv. 173, 183-89 (2005)
(book review). But its normative thrust is relevant here, even if one wishes to reject Dagan's specific
forms of implementing contribution-based restitution.
211. DAGAN, supra note 55, at 164.
212. Id. at 164-65. Dagan's more general claims about restitution as a remedy seem relevant as
well: Restitution "facilitate[s] informal intimate relationships by protecting interpersonal relationships
of reciprocity, trust, and reliance, and shielding the parties to such relationships against the lingering
risks of opportunism and abuse of trust." Id. at 165.
213. I show how friendship meets these criteria for liberal community elsewhere. See Leib, supra
note 6, at 642-47, 653-62.
214. 419 So.2d 1115 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1982).
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the property's value down the middle, the appellate court took an approach
common to the cohabitation context (when there is no contract between
the parties that otherwise controls asset distribution upon break-up):
contribution-based restitution. 215 That is, the respective families were
awarded a "share" of the joint home, in proportion to how much each
family put into creating the value. Dagan warns us that it would be hard to
see the contribution-based restitutionary remedy as the majority position-
plenty of courts treat cohabitants as essentially married, splitting property
down the middle, while many other courts essentially try to deter "living
in sin" by refusing to make any equitable distributions. 216 Still, Dagan
demonstrates that it is a common and desirable "middle-of-the-road"
approach.217
Dagan identifies and endorses a set of normative rationales for
contribution-based restitution in the cohabitation context that might apply
between friends. First, he sees those engaged in informal intimacies as
falling somewhere "between spouses and strangers." 218 Accordingly, he
believes that the doctrinal structure should support that situation, affording
those in informal intimacies more protection than the law would give to
strangers, who receive nothing other than their contractual entitlements,
and less protection than spouses, who he thinks should receive half of an
estate to reflect the altruistic aspirations of marriage. 219 It is certainly not
hard to see friendships as similarly resting between spouses and strangers,
counseling for similar treatment.
Second, Dagan explains a detail about the administration of the
contribution-based restitution remedy: it measures only benefits that fall
outside "the ordinary give-and-take of a shared life. '220 This limitation
enables those in long-term reciprocal relationships to avoid keeping tabs in
the day-to-day services the parties provide for one another and enables
courts to stay out of intimacies to some reasonable extent. The focus of
contribution-based restitution, then, is upon substantial investments of
time, energy, or money into a partner's business or assets.221
215. The case-along with other contribution-based restitution cases in the cohabitation context-
is discussed in DAGAN, supra note 55, at 165-68.
216. Id. at 167.
217. Id. at 167-68 (citing cases). Dagan discusses and cites the states that seek to deter
cohabitation in id. at 180-83.
218. Id. at 171.
219. Id.
220. Ann Laquer Estin, Ordinary Cohabitation, 76 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 1381, 1400 (2001).
221. See DAGAN, supra note 55, at 172.
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One can easily see here as well why this type of remedy might usefully
guide the law of the friend-as-fiduciaries. Certainly, no one wants broken
friendships to lead to litigation as a matter of course; the idea of people
suing their ex-friends for the value of their ordinary services as friends
sounds preposterous. Focusing on substantial benefits that can be
restituted through a contribution-based remedy seems appealing to limit
the number of suits courts will need to consider and to give effect to the
reality that much that we do for our friends is gratuitous-and should
remain so (for all the reasons gifts should be encouraged and facilitated
between friends).
As Dagan helpfully puts it in defending contribution-based recovery's
consonance with the values of liberal community:
On the one hand, setting the threshold at the level of [substantial]
benefits rejects the strict ... accounting that applies in other social
settings, thus refusing to reduce the [intimates'] relationship to
monetizable exchanges, seeking instead to preserve and inculcate
their sense of mutual responsibility. On the hand, by limiting the
degree of acceptable asymmetrical benefits ... such a regime takes
proper account of the limits of solidarity and the dangers of
opportunism. 222
Thus, to avoid commodification-certainly a potential danger if the
friend is to be treated as a fiduciary with enforceable obligations-the
remedy must attempt both to reinforce community and to provide a
mechanism to check opportunism. This availability for "an anti-
opportunistic device ... can reassure prospective parties that they will not
be abused for cooperating" and may inspire "willingness to cooperate
without focusing on the grave vulnerability that such trust can
engender., 223 Dagan plausibly argues that contribution-based restitution is
equal to the task224-and, accordingly, perhaps it should be considered
more widely within the friendship context when courts are presented with
breaches of attendant fiduciary duties.225 To use the hypothetical with
222. Id. at 173. Dagan prefers "extraordinary benefits." My instinct is that this rhetoric gives
courts too much reason to refuse recovery so I prefer to use a "substantial benefit" test.
223. Id. at 175.
224. Dagan also helps articulate why a "no-remedy" regime, where friends cannot sue one another
for breaches of trust, is unacceptable: "While seemingly utopian, the no-remedy regime is likely to
yield detrimental consequences in our non-ideal world. Long-term interpersonal relationships in liberal
environments are particularly vulnerable to opportunistic behavior because of the liberal commitment
to free exit, which is (correctly) perceived as a prerequisite to a self-directed life." Id. at 174.
Obviously, this cautionary note supports the entire argument of this Article.
225. Dagan further distinguishes between two formulas of the remedy-one that compensates the
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which I began, John might sue David not for a full disgorgement of his
one million dollar contract on account of his potential bad faith, potential
breach of a duty of confidentiality, and a potential misappropriation of a
"corporate" opportunity, but rather for a restitutionary remedy based upon
his contribution to the idea and its development; the recovery would not be
offset by any friendship benefits extrinsic to the idea.
Still, even if contribution-based recovery occupies an important place
as a default rule of sorts for breaches of friendship's fiduciary duties,
surely sometimes it will not be a proper remedy. Even in the John and
David hypothetical, it may seem undercompensatory. Indeed, precisely
because John and David are so much closer to spouses than they are to
strangers, a remedy closer to marriage's presumption of "equal sharing 226
may seem in order: friendship, like marriage, should be, ideally and
aspirationally through the law, egalitarian. As Dagan acknowledges,
"[r]eward in proportion to individual contribution or merit is incongruous
with the ideal of marriage as an egalitarian liberal community." 227 So
sometimes it will make sense to require a friend-defendant to share
earnings and award a profits-based remedy rather than a contribution-
based remedy. That is a judgment call that will depend on the intensity of
the friendship-and judges have the capacity to differentiate between
degrees of friendship for the purpose of constructing an appropriate
equitable remedy. Perhaps, however, they should presume an absence of a
spouse-like friendship unless there is clear and convincing evidence
otherwise.
IV. THE MISFITS AND THE DANGERS OF TREATING FRIENDS AS
FIDUCIARIES
Before concluding, I must briefly confront some hard questions about
my friends-as-fiduciaries model. Although I believe that, ultimately, our
law and moral lives would be enhanced by embracing the friends-as-
fiduciaries model, I must highlight ways the analogy between friends and
fiduciaries may not fit quite as perfectly as I have suggested as well as a
plausible "counter-vision" of the fiduciary concept that makes salient a
reasonable value of the substantially benefiting service and one that "apportions the total net
enrichment of the defendant according to the respective contributions of the parties." Id. at 175. Dagan
prefers the latter because it treats the parties as having been in a joint enterprise. Id at 175-76. I agree
and think it is the better way to calculate restitution in friendship-related contexts.
226. Id. at 178.
227. Id. at 179.
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substantial set of dangers that could result from more thoroughly adopting
my recommendations here.
A. Misfits?
Despite the general optimism of this Article that friendship relations
can be neatly mapped onto fiduciary law, there are some ways in which
the doctrines associated with fiduciary law do not make for a natural fit
with friendship. I discuss some of these potential gaps here, though
ultimately conclude that they do not bar broader legal treatment of friends
as fiduciaries.
The first potential difficulty is that much of fiduciary law focuses upon
a fiduciary's "superiority." Indeed, although I focus a great deal of
attention on the trusting nature of the fiduciary relationship, all courts
require something more than trust-sometimes termed ascendancy,
dominance, superiority, expertise, or information asymmetry-to find a
fiduciary relationship. 228 The particular challenge this framework poses for
friendship is that most accounts of friendship put equality at its center.
Graham Allan, a prominent sociologist of friendship, has observed that the"essence of friendship from a sociological perspective is that it is a tie of
equality., 229 Elsewhere he has written: "Friendship, in whatever form it
takes, is defined as a relationship between equals. That is, within
friendship there is little sense of social hierarchy or status difference. 230
And he is not alone among those who study friendship and friendship
networks. 231 Thus, if friendship is quintessentially about equality232 and
228. See, e.g., Burdett v. Miller, 957 F.2d 1375, 1381 (7th Cir. 1992); Landskroner v.
Landskroner, 797 N.E.2d 1002, 1013 (Ohio Ct. App. 2003); Scott & Scott, supra note 7, at 2402.
229. ALLAN, supra note 98, at 108.
230. GRAHAM ALLAN, KINsHIP AND FRIENDSHIP IN MODERN BRITAIN 89 (1996).
231. See, e.g., ROBERT BRAIN, FRIENDS AND LOvERS 20 (1976) ("Equality ... is part and parcel
of friendship."); MARILYN FRIEDMAN, WHAT ARE FRIENDS FOR? 207 (1993) (contrasting the equality
of friendship with the unequal power relations in families); Pat O'Connor, Women's Friendships in a
Post-Modern World, in PLACING FRIENDSHIP IN CONTEXT, supra note 96, at 117, 127; PAHL, supra
note 116, at 167 (Friendship is "egalitarian" and "has no place in hierarchies or authoritarian
structures."). I summarize the relationship of equality within friendship in Leib, supra note 6, at 646
("As between friends, no feelings of superiority are appropriate, and social prestige should be
irrelevant. Although friends are rarely equal in all ways, true friends treat one another as such. Friends
give and take equally, or risk rupturing the bond of friendship.").
232. But see EPSTEIN, supra note 116, at 8:
Francis Bacon, on this point, claims that 'there is little friendship in the world, and least of all
that between equals.' I take Bacon's point to be that equality between people is chiefly a spur
to rivalry, which can be death on friendship. And Balzac, with that worldly cynicism one
comes to expect (and enjoy) in him, backs up Bacon by remarking that 'nothing so fortifies a
friendship as the belief on the part of one friend that he is superior to the other.'
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fiduciary law is always focused upon relationships of inequality, they
hardly seem like a good match.
Still, whatever force this argument may have as a matter of rhetoric, it
lacks substance. As I have demonstrated, what fiduciary law is looking for
when it uses the language of superiority has nothing to do with social
prestige or a subjective feeling of superiority on the part of the fiduciary.
Rather, the inquiry into dominance, ascendancy, or expertise is a proxy for
the relational variable of vulnerability. Because, as I have already argued,
this variable is extremely common in friendship-indeed the paradigmatic
form of trust between friends displays substantial risk and vulnerability-
the legal rhetoric of superiority should not occlude the possibility for
fiduciaries to stand in relationships of social equality with their
beneficiaries. Equality does nothing to vitiate vulnerability.233
A second potential misfit between fiduciary law and friendship is that
fiduciary law traditionally regulates only one party-the fiduciary, not the
beneficiary 234 -and friendship is quite centrally a relationship of
reciprocity. 235 Friends would seem to owe one another duties, and those
duties are reciprocal. To the extent that fiduciary law is seen as a one-way
duty, the relationship of friendship does not quite fit because of a
mutuality of obligation, common to contractual relations and not fiduciary
ones.
This structural dissimilarity hardly substantially undermines the friend-
as-fiduciary model proposed here. Even if it were true that there were no
other examples of reciprocity in fiduciary law,2 36 there seems to be nothing
central to the fiduciary concept that would prevent reciprocal duties: Two
people can trust each other and, in certain circumstances, leave themselves
especially vulnerable to the other's predation or exploitation. Reciprocity
of trust and vulnerability, such as a lawyer and an accountant who have a
reciprocal relationship of representation, can be contemplated by fiduciary
law, even if it is not the prototypical case. To be sure, one could
reasonably make the case that dyads with mutual vulnerability should be
233. In his commentary on this paper at The Conglomerate, Brett McDonnell suggests that
partnership may also be a useful example to undermine this objection. The default rule in partnership
is that partners share equally, but they also owe fiduciary duties to each other as well. See Brett
McDonnell on Leib's Friends as Fiduciaries, July 30, 2008, http://www.theconglomerate.org/
2008/07/brett-mcdonnell.html (citing REVISED UNIFORM PARTNERSHIP ACT § 404 (1994)).
234. See, e.g., Frankel, supra note 4, at 819.
235. See, e.g., ALLAN, supra note 98, at 22; Leib, supra note 6, at 644-45.
236. But see Meinhard v. Salmon, 164 N.E. 545, 546 (N.Y. 1928) (in which Judge Cardozo
suggests that partners owe one another seemingly reciprocal fiduciary duties).
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treated differently from dyads where only one party is vulnerable.237 But
even if that were true (and it may very well be), I account for this issue by
delineating the types of fiduciary duties that are appropriate in the
friendship context. So although mutual reciprocity might call for a
different application of the menu of fiduciary duties than a one-way
vulnerability would, there is no clear reason to withhold the title of
"fiduciary" from the relationships of mutual reciprocity when they
otherwise fit the bill.
A final potential dissimilarity between the friend and the fiduciary has
to do with the right of free exit from the relationship. To be sure, in
fiduciary law, "[a]n important means of controlling misbehavior in most
[fiduciary] relationships is the [beneficiary's] right to terminate the
relationship or to replace" the fiduciary.238 But the fiduciary has much
more limited termination rights.239 Thus, one might say that the liberal
ideal of free exit is substantially circumscribed in fiduciary relations; even
beneficiaries have difficulties exercising their rights of termination.240
Friendship, by contrast, achieves some of its value in many people's eyes
precisely because it seems to allow for free exit by both parties. Not only
does the choice to enter voluntarily define the relationship (in
contradistinction to many relationships of status and kinship), so does the
choice to stay in it and maintain it. The background principle of free exit
helps reinforce friendship's value.241
Interesting as this seeming distinction between friendship and fiduciary
relationships may be, it is hard to take seriously the idea that friends can
perfectly "freely" exit their friendships without consequences (unless one
is comparing it to the exit costs of marriage). As in the case of fiduciary
relations, exit is hampered by substantial roadblocks. It is not easy to get
out of friendships once they are formed. Moreover, whatever value may
derive from a background presumption of free exit must be complicated by
the reality that any act of termination comes with very weighty costs: if it
is free, it probably was not a friendship of much value after all. Finally,
free exit seems to be the rule in at least one central fiduciary relationship:
principal-agent. 242
237. Thanks to Hanoch Dagan for pushing me hard on this issue.
238. See Scott & Scott, supra note 7, at 2428.
239. See FitzGibbon, supra note 4, at 310 (citing an attorney's limited right of withdrawal in the
Model Code of Professional Responsibility and a partner's restrictions on withdrawal).
240. See Scott & Scott, supra note 7, at 2428-29.
241. I discuss voluntarism in friendship in Leib, supra note 6, at 642, 663-67, and supra note 96.
242. See RESTATEMENT (TmRD) OF AGENCY § 3.10(1) (2006) ("Notwithstanding any agreement
between principal and agent, an agent's actual authority terminates if the agent renounces it by a
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I have not, of course, surveyed here every way fiduciary law and
friendship might be difficult to assimilate. But I have tried to show how a
few apparent dissimilarities do not stand in the way of seeing how the two
helpfully illuminate one another.
B. The Dangers for Fiduciary Law and Friendship
Beyond mere misfit, there are potentially significant dangers that might
be associated with the friend-as-fiduciary model. Below, I address one
from the perspective of fiduciary law and one from the perspective of
friendship. To the extent that these dangers have already been given
expression (in the work of Larry Ribstein, especially), they are overstated
and do not furnish very good reasons to refuse to treat close friends as
fiduciaries. Both dangers stem from the unintended consequences that can
result from regulating private behavior too intensely.
1. Stretching Fiduciary Law Too Far?
Recently, Larry Ribstein has forcefully called for a narrowing of
fiduciary duty law, suggesting that it cover only a small fraction of the
types of cases fiduciary doctrine now clearly covers.243 He wishes for
fiduciary law to apply only in "paradigm broad-delegation scenarios," 244
and he wishes for fiduciary law to delineate much more clearly the types
of relationships to which fiduciary law will be applied. As he writes,
"[r]ather than comparing costs and benefits of fiduciary duties on a case-
by-case basis, or providing for a continuum of relationships that involve
varying levels of duties, it is better to define a specific category of cases in
which a Meinhard-like fiduciary duty of unselfishness applies." 245 And it
is not just for the sake of clarity that Ribstein justifies his desire to
circumscribe fiduciary duty law: "Overuse of fiduciary duties increases
litigation and contracting costs, decreases the effectiveness of owners'
governance rights, and dilutes true fiduciaries' legal and extralegal
manifestation to the principal or if the principal revokes the agent's actual authority by a manifestation
to the agent. A revocation or a renunciation is effective when the other party has notice of it."). Thanks
to Deborah DeMott for this point.
243. See generally Ribstein, supra note 13.
244. Id. at 213. Although Ribstein surely does not intend to have friendship included in the small
list of fiduciary relationships he would recognize, friendship might come even within his cramped
definition: we give broad-scale delegations to our friends with very substantial access to our emotional
lives (and sometimes our capital).
245. Id.
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incentives. 246 Accordingly, Ribstein sees a substantial danger to the goals
and effectiveness of fiduciary law (and unnecessary costs to parties who
may decide to use contracts to avoid some of the consequences of
fiduciary law)247 when it gets stretched into new areas where he thinks
private ordering would be preferable.
Yet, as Ribstein would have to concede, fiduciary law is just too messy
for his vision to take hold in the law anytime soon. Fiduciary law's
flexibility and applicability to a broad set of relationships with a sliding
scale of duties and remedies is so much a part of its fabric that Ribstein's
vision is more of a misfit with the reality of fiduciary law than any claim I
make here on behalf of friendship. Indeed, as I have shown above, 248 many
courts already recognize the very model of the fiduciary elaborated here.
Friendship need not, therefore, be seen as an expansion of the fiduciary
concept at all; it can be seen, rather, as an underappreciated exemplar.
Moreover, as I have already discussed, Ribstein's worry about courts
squandering their moral authority by employing fiduciary rhetoric in too
many circumstances rings especially hollow in the friendship context,
where there need not be a substantial gap between legal and moral
standards of conduct.249 In fact, I made a substantial effort to tailor a law
246. Id. at 251.
247. In this Article, I have decided to side-step the question of whether the fiduciary duties of
friendship should be default rules that may be avoided by contract or whether they should be thought
of as mandatory rules (though many of Ribstein's arguments seem predicated on fiduciary duties being
mandatory, notwithstanding his deep commitment to contractarianism). On this general debate about
contractarianism and fiduciary duties, see, for example, Reza Dibadj, The Misguided Transformation
of Loyalty into Contract, 41 TULSA L. REv. 451 (2006); Henry N. Butler & Larry E. Ribstein, Opting
Out of Fiduciary Duties: A Response to the Anti-Contractarians, 65 WASH. L. REV. 1 (1990);
Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 5. I have given this question some attention in Leib, supra note 6, at
683-84 n.267, 706 n.423.
Although I cannot tackle this decades-long debate among scholars of fiduciary law in this context,
I can make one observation relevant to the friend-as-fiduciary model elaborated here, which may have
some potentially broader applications. Since many of the fiduciary duties to be applied within
friendships involve certain kinds of conduct surrounding the contracting process (the duties of good
faith, fair dealing, fair price, disclosure), it makes little sense to allow parties to contract out of these
duties because such contracts themselves would be subject to the very same constraints fiduciary law
imposes. This logical point, however, does not apply to every fiduciary duty: aspects of the duties of
loyalty and confidentiality may be sensibly waived. So there may be a middle road in which some
duties can be contracted around and some must remain mandatory. This is especially true within
friendship, where there is no standard form. When the law approaches friendship and interposes itself
into friendship, it must do so with sensitivity to friendship's variety, some of which relevant contracts
can usefully illuminate.
248. See supra Part III.A. To be sure, although I exposed the law's "ambivalence" toward the idea
of friends as fiduciaries, there is a much stronger doctrinal basis for the friend-as-fiduciary idea than
there is for Ribstein's view.
249. See supra text accompanying notes 117-18. Nevertheless, Ribstein's point about litigation
costs might remain: Are the social benefits of treating friends as fiduciaries worth the costs in terms of
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of friends-as-fiduciaries so that it would not depart too far from our moral
intuitions about how far the law should intervene in our private
relationships. 250
2. Crowding Trust
The threat posed to fiduciary law likely to result from treating friends
as fiduciaries is minimal. But it may be that there are threats to friendship
itself that might result from broader recognition of the friend as a
fiduciary. What if exacting legally enforceable fiduciary duties from
friends deters not only opportunism but friendship itself?. As Ribstein
writes, "Requiring fiduciaries to act unselfishly, and accept potential
liability, obviously deters people from becoming fiduciaries. 251 More
disturbingly still, what if legal regulation of the "strong form" 252 trust in
friendships actually served to crowd it out? If law replaces trust, a regime
of trust enforcement actually undermines the very important brand of trust
it was seeking to protect!
Ribstein's scholarship focuses on similar questions about the many
current and proposed uses of fiduciary duty law, though he has never
focused his attention upon friendship. One could reasonably assume,
however, given his desire to constrict the reach of fiduciary law, that he
would launch a similar argument against treating friends as fiduciaries,
emphasizing what fiduciary law would do to ruin the strong form of trust
that friendship engenders and sustains. He would likely highlight that
friendship relies on extralegal mechanisms for enforcement (like
reputation and morality) and that law could rarely be said to enforce
parties' expectations meaningfully because "the parties do not necessarily
producing more litigation, and likely more spurious litigation? One might argue that social benefits
certainly accrue from joint business ventures and marriages where fiduciary duties are common but
that the public benefits of friendship are much more subtle and do not easily look like they can
counterbalance the costs. Lynn Stout has pressed me on this issue especially.
Subtle though they may be, the benefits are not negligible. I expend great effort in two previous
articles to explain why the "cost" is worth it and just what sort of public benefits we can hope to
capture by using the law to support the institution of friendship. They include public health benefits,
the stimulation of new modalities of thought, the stimulation of the economy, and the saving of
enforcement costs in the legal system itself. See generally Leib, supra note 6; Leib, supra note 196.
250. See Mitchell, supra note 104, at 205 ("In order for the law to be effective, the legal structure
reinforcing trust must set forth principles which are both reasonable and ascertainable. . . . If the trust
embodied in the law requires too great a level of self-sacrifice in light of our personal goals, the system
either will be rejected or fall into eventual desuetude.").
251. Ribstein, supra note 13, at 217.
252. This concept is developed in Jay B. Barney & Mark H. Hansen, Trustworthiness as a Source
of Competitive Advantage, 15 STRATEGIC MGMT. J. 175, 179 (1994), and is discussed in Ribstein,
supra note 9, at 558-68.
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assume the law will back these expectations. '253 Further, he would draw
upon empirical evidence that law would actually undermine trust:
Experiments show that providing incentives or penalties for good or
poor performance actually undermines voluntary cooperation and
thereby makes such arrangements less efficient than relying on
voluntary cooperation. Legal enforcement also may reduce feelings
of reciprocity that enhance voluntary cooperation. Parties have been
shown to be more likely to cooperate voluntarily when the incentive
is a positive bonus for good behavior than when it is a negative fine
for bad behavior. Thus, parties who see themselves as adversaries,
or who are expected to behave selfishly, may behave accordingly.
Introducing ... fiduciary duties into close-knit relationships ...
requires the parties to negotiate over future litigation, hire lawyers,
and draft formal documents, as if they were in an arms' length
relationship. This encourages them to behave in other respects as
parties in such a relationship. Planning for litigation becomes a self-
fulfilling prophecy.25
4
Assuming the validity of the experiments upon which Ribstein's
arguments are based (and their appropriate application to the trust within
friendship), his arguments would seem to have apparent force here. If
friendship itself-or at least its distinctive form of trust-is what we wish
to promote,2 5 legal regulation may be counterproductive and may not
serve trust at all.256
There are really two separate claims embedded here. The first is about
providing people with the right incentives to make friends and the degree
to which a legal regime that enforced certain duties of friendship would
deter people from serving as friends. (The second claim, to which I shall
turn in a moment, is about the law replacing trust altogether.) Even
scholars from substantially different orientations to fiduciary law concede
that we need to give people proper incentives to enter fiduciary
253. Ribstein, supra note 13, at 229.
254. Id. at 234-35 (citations omitted). The studies upon which Ribstein relies are cited supra note
9.
255. I have already argued in favor of using the law in the service of friendship-promotion in Leib,
supra note 6, and Leib, supra note 196.
256. Although I try in what follows to provide a provisional set of responses to the crowding
thesis in the particular context of fiduciary law and friendship, there are already several long articles
that generally critique the crowding thesis more systematically and more comprehensively. See, e.g.,
Frank B. Cross, Law and Trust, 93 GEO. L.J. 1457 (2005); Claire A. Hill & Erin Ann O'Hara, A
Cognitive Theory of Trust, 84 WAsH. U. L. REv. 1717 (2006).
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relationships.257 But can we conclude that treating friends as fiduciaries is
actually likely to deter friendship?
This particular claim is probably testable. One could test the level and
intensity of friendship networks in different jurisdictions, and attempt to
observe if there is any correlation between a given jurisdiction's fiduciary
law (with respect to friendship) and that jurisdiction's levels and intensity
of friendships. As I highlighted in Part III, many courts already embrace
the friend-as-fiduciary model in some form, so it should be possible to
isolate those jurisdictions to see if the law has done anything to deter
friendship (though, to be fair, there are even intrajurisdictional
inconsistencies in this area of the law). Until that study is done, we are left
with mere conjecture.
But there is, perhaps, an important analogy that might be the basis of
sound conjecture: marriage. 258 Marriage carries with it substantial duties
that can extend very far into the future even if the marriage dissolves. Yet
it would be hard to believe that these substantial duties do much to deter
people from choosing to get married. Perhaps such incidental deterrence
(incidental because it is clearly not the law's aim to provide incentives
against marriage) functions at the margins among those who are
particularly rationalistic in intimate affairs. But, generally speaking, there
is reason to suppose that potential incidental deterrence at the margins is
not a serious reason to prevent the law's enforcement of special duties
within marriage relationships.
Friendship, like marriage, provides so many of its own incentives for
entry (and it is relatively easy to exit when the costs grow too great) that it
is hard to imagine legal regulations actually deterring people from
establishing and developing friendships. To be fair, friendship does not
carry quite as many legal perquisites as marriage does (nor is it as hard to
exit),259 so the analogy fails in an important way too: friendship has fewer
legal advantages to counterbalance the extra duties proposed here.260
Nevertheless, I think it is fair to conclude that the law will do little-
through the odd enforcement of a fiduciary duty in an extreme case of
257. See, e.g., Frankel, supra note 4, at 833.
258. See generally Carolyn J. Frantz & Hanoch Dagan, Properties of Marriage, 104 COLUM. L.
REv. 75 (2004).
259. I explore these in Leib, supra note 196, and Dan Markel, Jennifer M. Collins & Ethan J.
Leib, Criminal Justice and the Challenge of Family Ties, 2007 U. ILL. L. REv. 1147.
260. My view is that friendship should carry more legal perquisites, but I perfectly concede that
marriage carries many more under current legal rules. See Leib, supra note 6; Leib, supra note 196.
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disloyalty-to prevent people from enjoying the very real, albeit non-
legal, advantages of friendship.261
However, a legal regime that does exact special duties from friends will
likely result in people being much more clear with one another about their
relationship's status. In this way, fiduciary duties and their potential
enforcement will serve an "information-forcing" function,262 helping
parties organize their intimate affairs and enabling them to have a better
sense of the identities of their real friends. In a world where friendship
carries legal consequences, many people will try to disclaim that they are
friends with the people with whom they are transacting. Sometimes, such
disclaimers would be hard for courts to take seriously; other times,
disclaimers would helpfully prevent someone from thinking a party is a
friend when he has sent every signal to help a potential plaintiff avoid
unjustifiable reliance.2 63
And there is nothing wrong with friendship disclaimers in the abstract:
as Aristotle well understood, most tension within friendships results
because people are not clear about their relational intent and tend to lead
other people on.264 Making people more honest about how close they feel
toward the people with whom they interact would likely save many a lot of
personal pain.265 Thus, although certain types of fictive friendships may be
261. Just because the law can do little to undermine the benefits of friendship does not mean that
the law can do little to support the institution. I do not think saying that friendship can survive an
occasional legal incursion actually undermines the idea that legal protection can usefully help
friendship as an institution. Of course, it is hard to prove any of this, and it relies on one's intuitions.
But family and marriage strikes me as a useful analogy here: burdening family members with special
duties does not, as a general matter, make us think that trust is being crowded out. Rather, part of the
reason we burden families is to protect them and to support the special vulnerability within them. Is it
inconsistent to argue that the law should engage in this protection through an occasional legal burden?
I see the tension, of course, but it does not seem all that hard to see how to resolve it. The burden will
not crowd out the trust and may serve to protect vulnerability within. So, too, in friendship. Thanks to
Curtis Bridgeman for pushing me to make this clearer.
262. Indeed, this dynamic-of fiduciary duties forcing information disclosure-is at the center of
the "contractarian" view of fiduciary duty law. See, e.g., Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 5, at 426,
445. As I suggested supra note 247, I do not take a strong view here about "contractarianism" in
fiduciary duty law. But I think both "contractarians" and "non-contractarians" could embrace my
friend-as-fiduciary model, notwithstanding their different approaches to whether the bulk of the
fiduciary duties are default rules or mandatory ones.
263. But see Anderson, supra note 15, at 327-30 (arguing that courts seek objective evidence and
discount subjective evidence in determining whether a fiduciary relationship exists); id at 330 ("A
contract provision denying the existence of a confidential relationship ... when in fact such a
relationship did exist, should always be invalid and unenforceable. It would, in effect, represent a
disclaimer of fiduciary liability which, under the familiar rule everywhere, is void as against public
policy."); Westfall, supra note 15, at 857 n.142 (citing cases where Texas courts utilized objective
evidence to establish that parties were, in fact, close friends).
264. See ARISTOTLE, supra note 98, at 233, 243.
265. See Leib, supra note 6, at 706 n.423.
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deterred, real ones might be intensified, and parties will be able to send
more credible signals about their intent to be trustworthy since legal
sanctions will attach to those who betray trust.
The second claim, this one with some relevant empirical support, also
seems somewhat overstated. The major concern is that law will crowd out
trust and replace the important social resource of strong-form trust with a
thin legal version that will not be able to perform all the functions that the
strong form can. As Ribstein puts it, "[i]n short, legal coercion does not
help develop norms of trustworthiness or of trust. Moreover,... regulation
impedes development of trust norms by interfering with opportunities to
be genuinely trusting or trustworthy. 266
There are two important responses to this line of argument. First, and
most importantly, the argument seems predicated on the assumption that
one can have either strong-form trust that operates outside the law or
legally policed trust, and that in a given context they must be substitutes
rather than complements. But that assumption, explicit in Ribstein's
work,267 virtually guarantees the crowding conclusion. In any case, the
premise is flawed. It simply is not true that "the fact that there is some
reliance on the threat of sanctions mean[s] that there will be no room for
trust. '268 This is as true in the context of friendship as it is in our
relationships with our doctors, cell phone companies, cable companies,
meat producers, baby toy producers, and virtually every person with
whom we contract. 269 We may have to resort to legal sanctions (whether
stemming from contract law, tort law, property law, consumer protection
law, employment law, etc.), but this never crowds out fully the need for
trust and the reality of the possibility for some level of vulnerability. I
know I can sue my doctor or the hospital if something untoward happens
to me when I am under anesthesia. But that sort of trust in sanctions does
not help me choose a doctor or hospital, nor does it enable me to develop a
good relationship central to my well-being. Indeed, even the perfectly
rational calculators among us know that our legal remedies will tend to be
undercompensatory (when they are available at all-we might lose our
remedies because of technicalities, bad lawyers, unreliable juries, statutes
266. Ribstein, supra note 9, at 567.
267. Id. at 568 ("[L]aw must be regarded as a substitute for rather than complement of social
capital because it undermines the institutions that create it.").
268. BAIER, supra note 100, at 139.
269. See Mitchell, supra note 104, at 194 (arguing that we reasonably trust many others
notwithstanding imperfect information and imperfect policing mechanisms for violating that trust);
Erin A. O'Hara, Trustworthiness and Contract, in MORAL MARKETS: THE CRITICAL ROLE OF VALUES
IN THE ECONOMY (Paul J. Zak ed., 2007), available at http://ssm.com/abstract=929503.
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of limitations, or other unrelated legal difficulties, all of which we could
anticipate as a real risk from the outset). And even if the law punishes
really bad babysitters, that punishment will rarely make us feel whole
when a babysitter has killed our child through her negligence. Money
damages cannot always fully recompense betrayed trust. Thus, the
crowding thesis, even if it is defensible at some level, leaves plenty of
room for developing the important kind of trust that makes the world go
round, even if the law intervenes in some cases. Indeed, as Larry Mitchell
has argued, "certain preconditions, like a legal system sustaining the
values of trust, are necessary for trust to flourish., 270 Law makes trust
possible, in part.
Again here, marriage is a helpful, if imperfect, analogy. Just because
marriage is controlled by contracts, legal regulation, and a set of
mandatory duties cannot render legal sanctions as substitutes for trust.
There is no doubt that regulation complements and will have some
interaction effects with trust. But the crowding thesis in its strong form
does not make sense, whether in friendship or in marriage. The law can
play a facilitative role as much as it can stand in the way.
There is yet a further reason to be skeptical of the crowding thesis.
Crowding is most likely to result-and most likely to serve as a substitute
rather than a complement-when there is an environment of perfect
enforcement. Yet, fiduciary duty law is notable for its inability to police
behavior at the micro level. Indeed, its rhetoric is as strong as it is, in part,
because its standards can rarely be met and fiduciaries are so capable of
getting away with their betrayals. In a legal landscape of very imperfect
enforcement and regulation, trust is far from crowded out.
In the friendship context, imperfect enforcement is likely to be even
more widespread: unlike the thought of suing our trustees, corporate
officers, and lawyers, there is surely substantial stigma associated with
suing our friends. No amount of legal regulation will remove that stigma
because, for the most part, suing our friends is a way of ending a
friendship. Indeed, the suit is pretty strong evidence that the friendship is
beyond repair.271 What this means is that the crowding phenomenon will
make only small incursions into our friendships' basis in strong-form trust;
the law will help frame friends' self-conception without intruding too
heavily into the intimate sphere, where aspects of our closest friendships
270. Mitchell, supra note 104, at 204.
271. There is at least one way this may be incorrect: friends might collude to collect on one of
their insurance policies. See Estes v. Magee, 109 P.2d 631 (Idaho 1940) (a friend-patient sues a friend-
doctor, whose insurance he believes will pay for his recovery).
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272will remain. Sometimes fiduciary law merely expresses social norms
without actually being a very good enforcer of them-and considering the
possible validity of the crowding thesis, that may be a good thing too. Law
will not likely crowd out trust in close friendships and, even if it does
some, coherence and the sound legal concept of the fiduciary still
recommend treating the friend as a legal fiduciary.
V. CONCLUSIONS
The fiduciary concept recognized by our law is a flexible one. I have
argued here that it is flexible enough to encompass enforcement of certain
duties of friendship that we all know well from our moral lives.
Friendship-of a certain sort, to be sure-is undoubtedly a relationship of
trust and vulnerability, and fiduciary law is set up specifically to give
effect to and frame this sort of special relationship. Even if some are
ultimately persuaded that the misfit between the friend and the legal
fiduciary is too severe or that recognizing the friend as a fiduciary would
be too damaging to fiduciary law or the institution of friendship itself,
much can be learned from putting fiduciary law and friendship side-by-
side. Indeed, there are lessons of proper conduct that friends would do
well to internalize even if they will never carry the force of law.
Moreover, whatever one thinks of the normative agenda presented here
of trying to get more courts to appreciate the trust and vulnerability
constitutive of close friendships, I have shown that the law in many
jurisdictions already treats certain types of friends as fiduciaries and that
many plaintiffs ask courts to treat defendant-friends (or former friends) as
fiduciaries, subject to their special duties and remedial opportunities. This
Article should help guide courts when they are presented with such claims,
and should enable them to adjudicate these cases more systematically and
with greater sophistication. Nothing I have argued for here suggests that
all friends qualify for fiduciary treatment; rather, courts must not fear that
there is some category mistake being made by those claiming fiduciary
duties from their friends or former friends.
272. I actually think that the entire "separate spheres" story that neatly divides the social and the
legal is deeply flawed and very untrue to our experience in the worlds of the intimate and the law. See
generally VIViANA A. ZELIZER, THE PURCHASE OF INTIMACY (2005). But that is an argument for
another day.
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